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PREFACE
Privatisation is a 50-year experiment that has failed dismally in almost all counts.  Overall, pri-vate delivery of services is not cheaper, not 
more efficient, not more innovative, more transparent, 
accountable, or effective than public service delivery. 
The Covid-19 crisis has revealed how unpreparedness 
and unsafe conditions for workers and patients in pri-
vatised health and social care facilities lead to higher 
human and social cost than in the public services.
  A growing body of research and documentation shows that privatised services are being returned to public 
ownership and control. Cities, regions, communities, 
and some states are bringing public services back from 
private to public ownership due to the failure of priva-
tisation to keep its promises in term of cost effective-
ness, service quality and user access.  Fresh research 
by the Transnational Institute shows 1,400 successful 
cases of bringing public services back from private 
ownership and/or management involving 2,400 cities 
in 58 countries. 
PSI encourages remunicipalisation and has been sup-
porting this process for years, working with a coali-
tion of allies, under the umbrella of our Quality Public 
Services mandate.  Trade unions are aware of the chal-
lenges for workers in the transition and are engaged to 
protect their terms and conditions of employment. 
Each remunicipalisation case is unique due to specific 
local and national jurisdictions, political systems and 
social movements that underpin it.  
The growing remunicipalisation experience trade un-
ions are accumulating will allow peer learning and help 
to successfully address challenges. As the world pre-
pares for a post-Covid-19 order, there is a unique op-
portunity to reclaim a central role for substantial invest-
ment and rebuilding of quality public services for all, 
and remunicipalisation is an option for governments to 
do so. This trade union guide provides timely, exten-
sive analysis and case studies to support PSI affiliates 
in the process of reclaiming public service ownership 
and control in the common interest.
Rosa Pavanelli
General Secretary
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1.1. PURPOSE OF THIS GUIDE
This report was commissioned by Public Services International (PSI) to provide guidance to workers, trade unions and al-
lied civil society groups interested in taking back 
public services into public ownership and control. 
In particular, this guide provides an overview of 
the relevant stages of remunicipalisation - the re-
turn of privatised public services into public own-
ership on a local and regional level – and distils 
lessons learnt from case studies of remunicipali-
sation (and municipalisation) from the standpoint 
of trade unions.
There is growing evidence worldwide that pub-
lic service privatisation is not working. It is not 
the most effective use of public resources, does 
not deliver quality public services for users and 
puts profit before the needs of communities and 
the environment. Moreover, privatisation has in-
creased the fragmentation and precariousness of 
public service employment, has caused job cuts 
that damage services and resulted in a decline in 
trade union membership and collective bargain-
ing. Remunicipalisation can offer opportunities to 
reverse these trends. 
A compendium of 50 remunicipalisation case 
studies across the world spanning different sec-
tors draws out the lessons that trade unions, 
their members and civil society allies have learnt 
through campaigns for remunicipalisations in their 
local communities (see Table 1, see the appen-
dix)1.   Specific attention is paid to the trade union 
perspective in this exercise. For this reason, eight 
remunicipalisations (highlighted in the list below) 
are analysed in more detail to support trade un-
ions strategies in future campaigns for insourcing.
Demonstration in Lagos, Nigeria
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TABLE 1: LIST OF CASES IN THE COMPENDIUM TO THIS GUIDE
Sector Country City/region Status Level of insourcing
1 Energy Germany Berlin Successful Remunicipalisation
2 Energy Germany Hamburg Successful Remunicipalisation
3 Energy Germany Stuttgart Successful Remunicipalisation
4 Energy Germany Wolfhagen Successful Remunicipalisation
5 Energy Lithuania Lithuania, Vilnius Successful Remunicipalisation
6 Energy UK Nottingham Successful Municipalisation
7 Energy Tanzania Tanzania, Dar es Sa-laam unsuccessful
8 Health Care Australia Victoria In progress Remunicipalisation
9 Health Care Luoyang China In progress Remunicipalisation
10 Health Care Denmark South Denmark Successful Remunicipalisation
11 Health Care India Delhi Successful Municipalisation
12 Health Care UK Hinchingbrooke Successful Remunicipalisation
13 Health Care UK Somerset Successful Remunicipalisation
14 Infrastructure Canada Montreal Successful Remunicipalisation
15 Infrastructure UK Cumbria Successful Remunicipalisation
16 Social Care Denmark Syddjurs Successful Remunicipalisation
17 Social Care Norway Bergen Successful Remunicipalisation
18 Social Care Norway Oslo Successful Remunicipalisation
19 Transport Canada Fort McMurray Successful Remunicipalisation
20 Transport UK London Successful Remunicipalisation
21 Transport UK East Coast Successful Nationalisation
22 Transport Seoul South Korea Partial success 
23 Waste Canada Conception Bay South Successful Remunicipalisation
24 Waste Canada Port Moody Successful Remunicipalisation
25 Waste Canada Winnipeg Successful Remunicipalisation
26 Waste Columbia Bogota reversed Remunicipalisation
27 Waste Egypt Cairo Successful Remunicipalisation
28 Waste Germany Bergkamen Successful Remunicipalisation
29 Waste Norway Oslo Successful Remunicipalisation
30 Waste Spain, León Successful Remunicipalisation
31 Waste UK, Sheffield Unsuccessful /
32 Water Argentina Buenos Aires Successful Nationalisation
33 Water Bolivia Cochabamba Successful Remunicipalisation
34 Water Cameroon Yaunde Successful Nationalisation
35 Water France Grenoble Successful Remunicipalisation
36 Water France Paris Successful Remunicipalisation
37 Water Germany Berlin Successful Remunicipalisation
38 Water Germany Rostock Successful Remunicipalisation
39 Water Indonesia Jakarta In progress /
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1.2. METHODOLOGY
This research was conducted by the Public 
Services International Research Unit (PSIRU) in 
partnership with Public Services International 
(PSI) and draws on primary and secondary re-
sources. A case study approach was chosen to 
stimulate learning on remunicipalisation. Fifty 
case studies were selected from different sec-
tors and across different regions to provide trade 
unionists and community activists with a broad 
perspective on remunicipalisation. Out of the 50 
cases presented in this guide 42 have already 
been completed, four are ongoing, two were un-
successful and one was a partial success and in 
one case the remunicipalisation has been subse-
quently reversed (see Table 1). 
Out of the 50 case studies eight cases were se-
lected for further primary research from a trade 
union perspective in order to deepen knowledge 
in the field.  Out of those six cases, five were 
successful remunicipalisations while in one case 
a full remunicipalisation could not be achieved. 
Additionally, primary research was conducted to 
learn more about the ‘Australia People’s Inquiry 
on Privatization’ that demonstrated the failure of 
privatisation on a national scale and across sec-
tors. Original information and materials were col-
lected through a questionnaire and interviews 
conducted by PSI with representatives of PSI af-
filiated organisations, comprising of the following 
cases Waste, Canada, Winnipeg (CUPE); Water, 
France, Paris (CGT Eau de Paris and CFDT In-
terco); Waste, Oslo, Norway (Fagforbundet); and 
on the Australia People’s Inquiry on Privatization 
(PSI Asia-Pacific). In addition, PSIRU conducted 
interviews with PSI affiliate representatives on the 
following cases: Energy, Hamburg, Germany (Ver.
di); Transport, South Korea, Seoul (KPTU); Water, 
Rostock, Germany,  (Ver.di); Water, Berlin, (Ver.di); 
Water, Jakarta, Indonesia (various stakeholders). 
Preliminary findings were presented at two in-
ternational expert workshops, one in London 
in June 20182  and one in Geneva in December 
20183,  involving trade unionists, academics and 
representatives of civil society groups. In both 
workshops PSI trade union representatives with a 
direct experience of remunicipalising public ser-
vices and experts in the field of public service de-
livery provided feedback on the initial findings of 
the research, which was then included in the final 
version of this guide. 
The guide, in particular chapter 5, draws on find-
ings published in a paper titled ‘The labour di-
mension of remunicipalisation: public service 
workers and trade unions in transition’ by Daria 
Cibrario, part of “the Future is Public” series of 
the Transnational Institute (TNI)4.  The guide also 
draws on findings that were already published 
in reports written by Vera Weghmann on the fail-
ure of energy liberalisation commissioned by the 
European Public Service Union (EPSU)5, on the 
financing of public transport commissioned by 
the International Transport Workers Federation 
(ITF)6  and, in a jointly written report with Sandra 
Van Niekerk, on waste management in Africa and 
Arab countries commissioned by PSI7.
Sector Country City/region Status Level of insourcing
40 Water Italy Turin Successful Remunicipalisation
41 Water US New York Successful Remunicipalisation
42 Water Tanzania Dar es Salaam Successful Nationalisation
43 Water Turkey Antalya Successful Remunicipalisation
44 Catering, cleaning UK Leicester Successful Remunicipalisation
45 Cleaning UK, Nottingham Successful Remunicipalisation
46 Education India Kerala Successful Municipalisation
47 Funeral services Spain Barcelona In progress Municipalisation
48 Library services UK Croydon Successful Remunicipalisation
49 Parking Armenia Yerevan Successful Remunicipalisation
50 Prisons New Zealand Mt Eden Successful Nationalisation
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1. PSI defines Local and regional gov-
ernments (LRG)/municipal services 
as essential services in all subnational 
levels of government, including cities, 
metropolitan areas and territories. 
The nature of LRG services varies 
depending on countries’ constitutional 
arrangements, and can include public 
administration; public utilities (such as 
water and sanitation, electricity, and 
solid waste); public transport; public 
space maintenance; social, culture 
and education services (libraries, 
museums, kindergardens, schools and 
universities) as well as health and so-
cial services. Fire-fighters, emergency, 
medical first responders and municipal 
police can also fall within LRG servic-
es. See more at: https://publicser-
vices.international/resources/page/
local-and-regional-governmentmunici-
pal?id=9511&lang=en.
2. SI-PSIRU Remunicipalization Steering 
Committee, 28 June 2018, Univeristy of 
Greenwich, Greenwich UK 
3. PSI Global Labour Remunicipalisation 
Conference, 4-5 December 2018, ILO, 
Geneva, Switzerland.
4. Cibrario, D. (2019) The labour dimen-
sion of remunicipalisation: public 
service workers and trade unions in 
transition’, working paperTNI. 
5. Weghmann, V. (2019) Going Public: 
A Decarbonised, Affordable and 
Democratic Energy System for Europe. 
The failure of energy liberalisation. 
European Public Services Union 
(EPSU). 
6. Weghmann, V. (2019) People’s Public 
Transport Policy. Public Financing. 
International Transport Workers 
Federation. 
7. Van Niekerk, S. and Weghmann, 
V. (2019) Municipal Solid Waste 
Management Services in Africa and 
Arab Countries. Public Services 
International.
1.3. HOW THIS GUIDE IS ORGANISED
Chapter 2 provides an overview of remunicipali-
sation. It addresses some fundamental questions 
regarding the definition of remunicipalisation; how 
remunicipalisation differs from nationalisation and 
other insourcing processes; and how far remunic-
ipalisation is a global trend in the context of the 
wider pressure for privatisation of public services. 
Chapter 3 outlines the motives of local authorities 
that have insourced services and the processes 
of remunicipalisation, including the timing of con-
tract termination. Chapter 4 highlights the op-
portunities remunicipalisation brings for service 
users, workers, the local authorities and the en-
vironment. Chapter 5 provides guidance to trade 
unions on how to engage in and plan a remunic-
ipalisation campaign, including how to address 
resistance from the private providers. Chapter 6 
engages with common private sector strategies 
used to prevent the insourcing of public services. 
Chapter 7 showcases alternatives to privatisation 
of public services, demonstrating that public own-
ership provides opportunities for local financing 
schemes, scope for democratic control and com-
munity and worker participation. Finally, Chapter 8 
sums up the key lessons that can be learnt from 
the 50 cases selected in the compendium that 
accompanies this guide and Chapter 9 provides 
trade unions and civil society groups with a check 
list for planning a campaign for the remunicipali-
sation of a particular service. The appendix lists 
the compendium that accompanies this guide, 
where more detailed information is provided on 
each case. As outlined in Table 1, the cases are 
listed first by sector, then by country and city in al-
phabetical order.  As the research for most of the 
cases is based on desk research only the infor-
mation available varied significantly per case and 
hence the length of the cases in the compendium 
also differ. Additionally, the compendium includes 
two exerpts to highlight lessons that can be learnt 
from the failure of privatisation. The first one in-
cludes a case of company failure is about Carillion 
and the collapse of a giant private contractor in 
the UK (Box 1) and the second one draws out les-
sons that can be learnt from Australia’s “People 
Inquiry into Privatisation” (Box 2). 
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 Remunicipalisation:
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2.1. DEFINITIONS 
‘Privatisation’ is generally understood as the change from public to private ownership of as-sets, outsourcing of public services, and pub-
lic-private partnerships (PPPs). Indeed, conces-
sions, lease contracts, Build Operate and Transfer 
(BOT) contracts and other PPPs are all forms of 
privatisation and mean the partial or full transfer 
of management control – and sometimes owner-
ship - of public services to the private sector1. 
‘Remunicipalisation’ is the return of public ser-
vices from private control and/or ownership in any 
form to full public ownership, management and 
democratic control. Remunicipalisation means 
that municipalities and regional governments take 
back privately owned and/or managed services 
that are commissioned, under concession or 
funded by public bodies. The term thus empha-
sises the “sub-national” dimension of bringing 
public services back into public ownership in ter-
ritories and communities. In some cases, this can 
include people and community-led public bodies 
such as public cooperatives (see for example 
Case 4. Energy, Germany, Wolfhagen). However, 
no matter what form public ownership takes, a 
remunicipalised service must fulfil the principle of 
universal access, meaning that all residents can 
benefit from the service.  This is especially rele-
vant when public services are delivered through a 
cooperative. Those responsible for commission-
ing the services must ensure that everyone in the 
municipality benefits from the service rather than 
just limiting access to the service to the members 
of the cooperative (see also section 7.5).
This guide also includes examples of ‘municipal-
isation’ in which local or regional governments 
have established new municipal companies within 
liberalised public service markets to make a par-
ticular public service available, better or cheaper. 
This is especially common in the energy sector 
(see Case 2. Energy, Germany, Hamburg; Case 
6. Energy, UK, Nottingham), but also takes place 
in other services (see for example Case 11. Health 
Care, India, Delhi; Case 47. Funeral services, 
Spain, Barcelona). 
‘Public Sector Insourcing’ refers to public 
service transfers back from private to public 
ownership, management and control at all ad-
ministrative levels, from the municipal to the na-
tional level. This guide will therefore use both 
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terms ‘remunicipalisation’ and ‘public sector in-
sourcing’ to refer to the return of privatised public 
services to public ownership and control. While 
the term remunicipalisation is only used to refer to 
local and regional services, public sector insourc-
ing is used regardless of whether this change 
takes place at municipal or at the national level. 
While the emphasis is on the local level the guide 
also includes examples of nationalisations. This 
guide is only concerned with the insourcing back 
into the public sector, hence the term public sec-
tor insourcing is used. However, outsourcing can 
happen on multiple levels and one private compa-
ny can in turn outsource parts of their service to 
another private company. As such, insourcing can 
also describe the process of the prime company 
taking back a whole service under its control. 
2.2. REMUNICIPALISATION: 
A GLOBAL TREND
More than 1,400 (re)-municipalisation cases were 
identified since the year 2000 involving more 
than 2,400 cities in 58 countries (See Figure 1)2. 
This figure is likely to be an understatement as 
most remunicipalisations are not publicly record-
ed and therefore unknown. It is also clear that this 
figure is constantly rising as more local authorities 
decide to take back control by insourcing public 
services. In the United Kingdom, between 2016-
2018 at least 222 local government contracts 
were remunicipalised3. While most remunicipali-
sations are happening in high income countries, 
increasingly public services are being brought 
back under public ownership in low- and mid-
dle-income countries.
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FIGURE 1: REMUNICIPALISATION CASES 2019
Source: Kishimoto, S. and Petitjean, O. (eds) 2019. The Future is Public. Transnational Institute.
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There are various reasons why remunicipalisation 
has so far been most widespread in high-income 
countries. Many countries in the global North 
have a history of localised service provision, while 
in emerging countries public services have been 
more centralised. In Latin America, for example, 
there has been some large-scale public service 
renationalisation, such as in electricity, telecom-
munication, municipal waste and postal services. 
This was mostly motivated by service user and lo-
cal government dissatisfaction with the poor qual-
ity of private operator service delivery and by the 
desire to regain control over the cost and quality 
of public services4.  Campaigns for remunicipali-
sation in Europe need to be seen within the wider 
context of the defence of public services in the 
wake of austerity and budget cuts5. 
2.3. PRIVATISATION TRENDS 
In 2018, in a report on poverty and human rights, 
the United Nations concluded that:
“Privatisation often involves the systematic elim-
ination of human rights protections and further 
marginalization of the interests of low-income 
earners and those living in poverty.6” 
Yet the privatisation of public services contin-
ues to be encouraged across the globe by gov-
ernments and international organisations, espe-
cially widespread are privatisations in the form 
of Public-Private-Partnerships (PPP). A PPP is 
a contract between a government and a private 
company under which a private company financ-
es, builds, and operates some element of a public 
service; and gets paid over a number of years, ei-
ther through charges paid by service users (often 
called a concession), or by payments from the 
public authority, or a combination of both7.  
As Figure 2 shows, worldwide, privatisation is 
increasing. The global revenues from privatisa-
tion in 2015 and 2016 – the latest figures that 
are available - were higher than ever before. The 
bulk of privatisation is happening in China which 
raised $173.2 billion (€158.4 billion) during 2015, 
and $148.0 billion (€134.0 billion) during 20168. 
In terms of infrastructure projects the support for 
PPPs seems to be stronger than ever (see Figure 
3)9.  Investments in PPPs have grown in absolute 
terms since 1991. This growth in PPPs was unaf-
fected by the global financial crisis as many coun-
tries made use of PPP infrastructure projects to 
boost investment. While there was a decline of 
FIGURE 2: WORLDWIDE REVENUES FROM PRIVATISATIONS 1988-2016
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FIGURE 3: INVESTMENTS IN PPP INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS, 1991-2015
Source: PPI Database, World Bank, as of November 2015.
PPPs in 2013, mainly due to a slowdown in PPPs 
in Brazil and India, investments in PPPs have been 
growing worldwide10.  
Privatisation has been actively promoted by high-
ly resourced and influential institutions and or-
ganisations like the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Commission, 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) as well as by private inter-
ests entrenched in multinational corporations, 
private equity firms, think tanks and other private 
investment groups. They promote neo-liberal, 
market-led approaches to public service provi-
sion, a vision of minimalist state intervention and 
reform of the public sector because of its alleged 
inefficiencies. According to the World Bank 
“PPPs can bring greater efficiency and sustaina-
bility to the provision of public services such as 
energy, transport, telecommunications, water, 
healthcare, and education. PPPs can also allow 
for better allocation of risk between public and 
private entities11”. 
In contrast, public service remunicipalisation is 
generally supported by civil society organisa-
tions, community and grassroot organisations, 
social and civic movements, trade unions as well 
environmental coalitions. These social forces 
define public services as a public good, funded 
by progressive taxation and underpinned by the 
principles of universal user access, quality, sus-
tainable financing via public banks and profit rein-
vestment, decent employment and participatory/
democratic control. Some mayors, municipalities 
and local authorities – at times regardless of their 
political colours – have also promoted public ser-
vice remunicipalisation (see section 5.4). 
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Remunicipalisation drivers
3. 
3.1. REASONS FOR BRINGING OUR 
PUBLIC SERVICES BACK IN HOUSE
There are several factors driving remunic-ipalisations. In both high, middle- and low-income countries insourcing is of-
ten a response to the failures of privatisation1. 
Privatisation often results in a loss of public ac-
countability and financial transparency and in-
sufficient contract monitoring that may facilitate 
corruption. Long term concessions, especially 
common in the water and electricity sector, pro-
vide an incentive for corruption as companies are 
eager to secure this one-off opportunity for guar-
anteed profits for decades.2  Insourcing has oc-
curred across many public service sectors, but it 
is especially common in essential public services 
such as water, electricity, waste management and 
health care, as the failure of privatisation in those 
sectors has the most severe consequences on 
service users, communities and territories. 
Additionally, budget cuts arising from austerity 
measures have forced local authorities to review 
their service delivery. Hence, governments at all 
levels, civil society organisations, trade unions 
and communities searching for more effective 
and efficient use of public money and resourc-
es often find that remunicipalisation provides an 
answer.3  
The cases listed in the compendium (see appen-
dix) reveal common reasons for remunicipalising 
public services. These include: 
Dysfunctional company operations
 z Poor company performance and poor service 
quality;
 z Private company withdrawal from contracts or 
failure to provide the contracted service;
 z Bankruptcy of contractors;
Lack of control of public services
 z Lack of control over service delivery and 
inability to fix problems once the service is 
privatised;
 z Unwillingness of contractors/private providers 
to go beyond the strict contract terms to 
service communities;
Workers and service users
 z Under-investment in service resources, staff 
and infrastructures;
 z Soaring bills for users;
 z Unequal service delivery (servicing of profitable 
users and areas, disregard of non-profitable 
users and areas);
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 z Lack of social and/or environmental sustain-
ability (poor worker conditions, job cuts and 
pollution). 
Lack of transparency and accountability
 z Lack of transparency in service price charges;
 z Fraud and conflict of interest;
 z Disputes between private providers and 
contracting institutions over operational costs 
and price increases.
However, remunicipalisation is usually not simply 
driven by contract failure or financial rationality. 
As many of the cases in the compendium demon-
strate remunicipalisation would not have hap-
pened without the pressure from environmental 
and social movements as well as from trade un-
ions (see for example: Case 1. Energy, Germany, 
Berlin; Case 2. Energy, Germany, Hamburg; Case 
17. Social Care, Norway, Bergen; Case 24. Waste, 
Canada, Port Moody; Case 26. Waste, Columbia, 
Bogota; Case 27. Waste, Egypt, Cairo; Case 29. 
Waste, Norway, Oslo; Case 33. Water, Bolivia, 
Cochabamba; Case 37. Water, Germany, Berlin; 
Case 40. Water, Italy Turin; Case 46. Education, 
India, Kerala). In a context in which international 
organisations as well as national governments are 
pushing for further privatisations, remunicipalisa-
tion is most likely to emerge as the outcome of 
social struggles rather than from a purely objec-
tive cost-benefit analysis (see section 2.3). 
3.2. WHEN TO REMUNICIPALISED?
3.2.1. After contract expiry
Most remunicipalisations occur when a contract 
for a privatised service expires. This means that 
trade unions can identify remunicipalisation op-
portunities early on by mapping private contrac-
tors and keeping track of contract expiry dates. 
Being aware of the expiry dates enables trade un-
ions to plan remunicipalisation campaigns and to 
approach mayors and local authorities in advance 
to outline the advantages of the public alternative 
to privatisation. 
When the information about the service expiry is 
not freely available trade unions may need to in-
voke ‘freedom of information’4  requirements or 
resort to relevant international and national laws 
available to obtain such information. At times 
contract details are kept secret and are not avail-
able to the public (see Case 37. Water, Germany, 
Berlin). In these cases, contract expiry dates 
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might be found through documentation or media 
coverage of tenders or company annual reports. 
When collective bargaining takes place, trade un-
ions can additionally put service quality and deliv-
ery issues on the collective bargaining agenda to 
obtain this information from employers.
The following examples illustrate that contract ex-
piry provides the opportunity for remunicipalisa-
tion:  Case 2. Energy, Germany, Hamburg; Case 5. 
Energy, Lithuania, Vilnius; Case 15. Infrastructure, 
UK, Cumbria; Case 16. Social Care, Denmark, 
Syddjurs; Case 23. Waste, Canada, Conception 
Bay South; Case 24. Waste, Canada, Port 
Moody; Case 38. Water, Germany, Rostock.  
3.2.2. Following early contract termination
 
Some municipalities and local authorities may de-
cide to terminate contracts earlier than their expi-
ry date because the private contractor is failing to 
meet the service quality standards required, is in 
financial difficulties or because they have become 
too costly, especially in a context of austerity. 
Early termination can be expensive, as contracts 
with private operators often include costly com-
pensation clauses and, in some cases, legal 
protection from profit loss that can be enforced 
via national courts as well as internationally via 
Investor State Settlement Dispute (ISDS) mecha-
nisms (see section 6.2). Consequently, contract 
expiry generally provides easier opportunities for 
public service remunicipalisation. The threat of 
compensation might in some cases deter mu-
nicipalities from remunicipalising a service. For 
example, in Sheffield, UK, the council voted in 
January 2017 for an early end to the city’s 35-
year waste management contract with Veolia, 
agreed in 2001 and due to expire in 2036. For the 
council, the contract was no longer perceived 
to meet the city’s needs.5 However, threats of a 
very high compensation claim by Veolia prevent-
ed the remunicipalisation6 (see Case 31. Waste, 
UK, Sheffield).
However, remunicipalisation is not guaranteed 
to be a smooth and conflict free process, even 
if the local authority waits for the contract expiry. 
Compensation can still be demanded by the pri-
vate providers if a service is remunicipalised after 
the contract comes to an end.  This can be illus-
trated by Vilnius’ experience with Vilniaus Energija 
- a subsidiary of the French multinational Veolia. 
When a 15-year lease expired in late March 2017, 
Vilnius transferred the district heating grid back 
to the municipal heating supplier Vilniaus Silumos 
Tinklai7.  The process of  remunicipalisation was 
conflict ridden; in early 2016, Veolia took the 
Lithuanian government to the International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in 
Washington, demanding about 100 million euros 
in compensation for what it said was unfair state 
behavior and appropriation of its investments in 
Lithuania.8  In a counter law suit after the remu-
nicipalisation, the city of Vilnius turned to the 
Stockholm arbitration court to demand around 
200 million euros in compensation from Veolia 
and Vilniaus Energija for damage caused to the 
assets during the lease period.9  Both court cases 
are still ongoing (see Case 5. Energy, Lithuania, 
Vilnius). 
In Cameroon, the government decided not to 
renew the contract for water production and 
distribution with the Moroccan consortium, 
Camerounaise des Eaux (CDE). Yet despite wait-
ing until the contract expiry in May 2018 CDE still 
demanded US$19 million in compensation.10  CDE 
had been responsible for water production and 
distribution in Cameroon for ten years and the 
decision to re-nationalise the water service was 
taken after years of poor service quality and over-
billing.11  Moreover, the public sector had out-per-
formed the private sector. Greater achievements 
were made in expanding the access to drinking 
water when the water services where publicly 
owned and controlled than during the years of 
privatization12  (see Case 34. Water, Cameroon, 
Yaunde).
Despite the increased risk that companies will de-
mand compensation if contracts are terminated 
early, in some cases it might well be a risk worth 
taking. This is because, the compensation could 
be lower than the continuing costs that occur 
with the private company operating the service. 
For example, in Bogota, Colombia, in 1994, Suez 
Degremont’s subsidiary Bogotana de Aguas y 
Saneamiento won the 30-year Salitre wastewater 
BOT contract - three years for construction and 
27 years for the operation of the plant, serving 
two million people in Bogota. In December 2004, 
the contract was terminated after the city council 
calculated that the project was charging ten times 
too much, and that it was worth paying US$ 80 
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million to buy out the contract.13  Similarly, Berlin, 
Germany remunicipalised its water services in 
2013, 15 years prior to contract expiry as the long-
term gains outweighed the cost. However, water 
remunicipalisation did not come cheap: Berlin 
agreed to pay RWE and Veolia what they would 
have received in profits until the end of the con-
tract in 2028 - over €1.2 billion in total (see Case 
33. Water, Germany, Berlin). Both cases show 
that it is important to weigh the potential short-
term and one-off costs of remunicipalisation 
- including compensation costs - in the case of 
unilateral termination, against the long-term cost 
savings that could be made putting an end to pri-
vate sector overcharging practices.
Just because companies make claim compensa-
tion via ISDS mechanisms does not necessarily 
mean that they are successful. Often the threat 
of compensation is used as an intimidation tech-
nique to prevent the insourcing of a service (see 
section 6.2). The cases of Cochabamba, Bolivia 
and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania illustrate that while 
ISDS mechanisms indeed provide a powerful tool 
for multinational companies to claim compensa-
tion for lost profits when public services are in-
sourced. In practice the scope of compensation, 
and even whether compensation is at all required, 
is eventually down to negotiation and thus the 
power of individual states and/or regions. These 
negotiations do not take place in a vacuum but 
are influenced by post-colonial contradictions 
over sovereignty under globalization, and by con-
tinued political contestation over the resurgent 
role of the public (see Case 33. Water, Bolivia, 
Cochabamba; Case 42 Water, Tanzania, Dar es 
Salaam).
When considering early termination local authori-
ties must consider that the legal proceedings that 
it might invoke can be very costly and time-con-
suming.  In such cases, pro-bono lawyers can 
help defend the right to take back public servic-
es (see for example Case 25. Water, Indonesia, 
Jakarta; Case 37. Water, Germany, Berlin). 
3.2.3. Following private company withdrawal or 
bankruptcy
There have been opportunities for remunicipali-
sation when companies have withdrawn from the 
contract because they mis-calculated their profit 
margins or went bankrupt. 
For example, in London the Borough of Croydon 
tried for years to part with its subcontractor 
Carillion, which was in charge of managing its mu-
nicipal libraries. Despite the service being unsat-
isfactory, Croydon could not find a feasible way 
to terminate the contract early. The contract was 
supposed to end in 2020. When Carillion went 
into compulsory liquidation on the 15th of January 
2018, (see Box 2 Carillion), Croydon used the 
opportunity to remunicipalise its 13 libraries (see 
Case 48. Library services, UK, Croydon).14  
Due to similar circumstances a number of munici-
palities in Oslo, Norway took back their waste col-
lection services in 2017. First, the private provider, 
Veireno filed for bankruptcy in January 2017, fol-
lowed by another private provider, RenoNorden 
in the autumn of the same year.15  In 2016, as 
many as 20 per cent of the 50,000 households 
that received their waste collection services from 
Veireno complained about the poor quality of the 
service (see Case 29. Waste, Norway, Oslo).16  
3.3. SECTORIAL DIMENSIONS OF 
REMUNICIPALISATION
3.3.1. Water
While in the past water has been mostly seen as 
a public service and a common good it has, since 
the 1990s, increasingly become a commodity. 
Water companies have become financial assets 
for global private investment instead of companies 
that have the primary purpose to deliver equitable 
and affordable basic services. Consequently, re-
turns to shareholders have become more impor-
tant than the investments in infrastructure need-
ed for the delivery of equitable and affordable 
basic services.  As a result, wages in the water 
sector have been increasingly squeezed. In more 
academic terms, the water sector has become 
increasingly financialised.17 Profit-making in the 
water sector has become more and more dis-
connected from the real economy, as investment 
funds bought water companies - usually through 
debt – largely for speculative purposes.18  
As water privatisation has progressed on a global 
scale so did the experiences of its failure. Making 
profit out of water has had detrimental conse-
quences for people and the environment. Several 
social struggles have emerged over water, among 
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which the famous Bolivian water wars in 2000 
(see Case 33. Water, Bolivia, Cochabamba) led 
to global advocacy coalitions that emphasised 
the immorality of water privatisation. Citizens 
and trade unionists in Bolivia argued that water 
should be seen as a human right and thus de-
manded for water services to be returned to pub-
lic ownership and control.19  In some struggles 
for publicly owned water, for example in Greece 
and in Portugal, the activists developed a narra-
tive around water as a common good, that should 
be owned and administrated by the public. This 
narrative was framed as a direct ideological chal-
lenge to neoliberal capitalism and its commodifi-
cation of water.20  
In the past two decades remunicipalisation in the 
water sector has grown rapidly on a global scale 
and is gaining strength. In 2000 only two cas-
es in two countries were recorded, but by 2019 
there were 311 cases across 36 countries.21  The 
water remunicipalisation tracker keeps a world-
wide record of successful and ongoing remunic-
ipalisations in the water sector.22  Most water re-
municipalisation cases are found in high income 
countries. France, the country with the longest 
history in water privatisation and home of the two 
leading water multinationals, Suez and Veolia, has 
recorded the most water remunicipalisations. Yet, 
water service remunicipalisations are also oc-
curring in low- and middle-income countries.23 
The compendium accompanying this guide in-
cludes 12 water remunicipalisation cases, of 
these, six are located in high income countries 
(Case 35. Water, France, Grenoble; Case 36. 
Water, France, Paris; Case 37. Water, Germany; 
Berlin; Case 38. Water, Germany, Rostock; Case 
40. Water, Italy Turin; Case 41. Water, US, New 
York) and six in low- and middle-income coun-
tries (Case 32. Water Argentina, Buenos Aires; 
Case 33. Water, Bolivia, Cochabamba, Case 
34. Water, Cameroon, Yaunde; Case 39. Water, 
Indonesia, Jakarta; Case 42. Water, Tanzania, 
Dar es Salaam; Case 43. Water, Turkey, Antalya).
3.3.2. Energy 
A recent PSIRU report which critically evaluated 
the energy liberalisation in Europe showed that 
it has failed to achieve its goals.24 The European 
Commission predicted that opening up the ener-
gy market would have a significant impact on na-
tional productivity and lead to price reductions. 
However, instead of the predicted decreases in 
electricity and gas prices as a result of energy 
liberalisation and privatisation, the opposite has 
occurred: prices for the consumer increased. 
Energy poverty across Europe doubled over a 10-
year period.
Rapid increases in the use of renewable energy 
are widely seen as essential if climate change is 
to be effectively combated. However, while it is 
a widespread belief that renewable energy man-
aged to thrive due to the market liberalisation, 
but here the reverse is the case. Without protec-
tion from the market, renewables would not have 
been built in the competitive electricity markets. 
In other words, the rise of renewable energy was 
only possible because of measures isolating it 
from market liberalisation and not because of 
market liberalisation. This shows the market logic 
cannot successfully accommodate renewables. 
Consequently, the PSIRU report argues that pub-
lic institutions are much better positioned to ad-
dress the urgency of climate change while also 
protecting workers.
And indeed, public ownership in the electrici-
ty sector is on the rise. In fact, the energy sec-
tor features the largest number of remunicipal-
isation projects – 374 cases in 2019. However, 
80 per cent of those are located in Germany.25 
Stadtwerke (municipal utilities in German) now 
supply half of all the electricity in Germany to 
households and 80 per cent of the distribution 
networks are owned and run by the regional and 
municipal public authorities.26  
The remunicipalisations in the electricity sector 
in Germany were mainly driven by society’s de-
mand for increased renewable energy and by the 
poor performance of the private companies in 
this regard. The biggest four private companies 
that dominated the German energy market were 
wedded to traditional energy production based 
on coal and nuclear power.  The wave of remu-
nicipalisation in the energy sector is part of what 
became known as the German Energiewende or 
energy transition - the country’s plan to transition 
to a low-carbon and nuclear-free economy. This 
shows that remunicipalised energy is about much 
more than a mere change of ownership. Civil so-
ciety groups demanding more renewable energy 
and a sustainable energy supply have been one 
of the main drivers behind the remunicipalisations 
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in Germany (see Case 1. Energy, Germany, Berlin; 
Case 2. Energy, Germany, Hamburg; Case 3. 
Energy, Germany, Stuttgart, Case 4. Energy, 
Germany, Wolfhagen).
Elsewhere local authorities have decided to take 
back control of their energy systems. For exam-
ple, in Vilnius, Lithuania the district heating grid 
was insourced after 15 years of privatisation (see 
Case 5. Energy, Lithuania, Vilnius). 
In the UK, several local authorities established 
municipally owned energy supply companies 
that, in competition with the private supply com-
panies, supply energy to the end user. As a pub-
lic, non-profit provider they have a comparative 
advantage as they save costs by not paying divi-
dends to shareholders. Consequently, these mu-
nicipal and regional supply companies can provide 
cheaper energy for users such as in the case of 
Robin Hood Energy in Nottingham, UK. While the 
nationalisation of the largest supply companies 
that dominate the UK energy market would be the 
most effective fix for energy poverty,27  energy 
remunicipalisation would be a valuable stepping 
stone in the fight against energy poverty, which 
is also a rising concern in high income countries. 
The case of Robin Hood Energy also shows that 
public energy supply can bring opportunities for a 
better deal for workers. See Case 6. Energy, UK, 
Nottingham. 
3.3.3. Transport and infrastructures
Evidence suggests that privatised transport sys-
tems are expensive and that the quality of the ser-
vices is inferior to publicly owned and controlled 
public transport. A study of rail PPPs across the 
globe came to the conclusion that most PPPs 
ended up as financially unviable and became a 
drain on public budgets.28  
For example, in the UK, rail privatisation led to 
a fragmented and inefficient rail system. This is 
clearly demonstrated by the East Coast train link 
in the UK which had to be taken back into pub-
lic ownership twice following failed franchising. 
During the time the East Coast line was operated 
publicly it operated on a surplus while the service 
quality, especially in terms of punctuality and user 
satisfaction, improved (see Case 21. Transport, 
UK, East Coast).
Switzerland has demonstrated what is possi-
ble when the railway network is in public hands. 
By making the quality of the service the priority, 
Switzerland constantly maintained and has ex-
panded its public railways network. It is not only 
a very expansive network – even rural towns and 
villages up in the mountains can be reached by 
train – but it also has exceptionally high punctu-
ality rates. Switzerland’s system of direct democ-
racy has repeatedly backed investment in public 
transport, and this confirms research on partici-
patory budgeting that suggests the funding of 
basic services is a vote winner and that, if given a 
say, people will back it.29 
With regards to bus transport, a wide-ranging 
study that assessed bus services in 73 cities, 
across all continents and different types of bus 
operators concluded there was no significant dif-
ference in efficiency between public and private 
operators.30  However, profits and cost reductions 
are the first priority of private operators, and this 
usually conflicts with wider public transport ob-
jectives, such as addressing congestion, environ-
mental impact and social equity.31  As such public 
bus operators outperform private ones in terms of 
the quality of the service, safety and the pay and 
working conditions of bus drivers.32  
In Canada, Fort McMurray’s experience with the 
privatisation of its bus rapid transit, which led to 
understaffing and frequent delays and bus can-
cellations, illustrates this point. When the service 
was remunicipalised the quality of the bus transit 
serviceimproved and the staff benefited from bet-
ter working conditions (see Case 19. Transport 
Canada, Fort McMurray). 
Moreover, private bus transport operators often 
select the most profitable services that neglect 
more remote and poorer areas. For example, a 
study carried out in India found that private bus 
operators appeared to be more efficient, but not-
ed that this could have been due to the operator’s 
selection of more profitable routes, as well as 
cuts to the wages and conditions of its workers.33 
Similarly, a recent study that focused on England 
showed that privatisation led to fare increases 
outside of London and the services worsened. 
Consequently, bus-use fell: bus trips in English 
metropolitan areas outside of London halved 
from about 2 billion per year in 1985 to 1 billion 
per year in 2016. In other words, the privatisation 
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of transport often hinders universal service cover-
age and access, decreases affordability for users 
while increasing profitability by increasing user 
fees and squeezing the workers who operate the 
service. 
A recent PSIRU report on the financing of pub-
lic transport demonstrated that the public sector 
has a comparative advantage over the private 
sector in delivering public transport services that 
reflects the needs of the users, the environment 
and the workers.34  
3.3.4. Waste 
Waste management is one of the most frequent-
ly insourced public services, in part because the 
contract length is usually much shorter than with 
water for example, so the opportunity to remunic-
ipalise arrives sooner. Negative experiences with 
privatisation (see for example Case 27. Waste, 
Egypt, Cairo) and/or company failure and bank-
ruptcy (see for example Case 29. Waste, Norway, 
Oslo and Box 2) are among key drivers behind 
waste remunicipalisations. More commonly, how-
ever, the insourcing of waste services is motivat-
ed by cost efficiency considerations. 
For example, in Liverpool, UK the municipality 
achieved cost savings of £2m over three years 
simply because the publicly run service was 
more cost effective.35  Cost savings were also 
achieved in the following cases: Case 23. Waste, 
Canada, Conception Bay South; Case 26. Waste, 
Columbia, Bogota; Case 28. Waste, Germany, 
Bergkamen; Case 30. Waste, Spain, León. 
In Germany a growing trend towards the insourc-
ing of waste services can be observed. At the 
beginning of the 2000s a whole series of remu-
nicipalisations in the waste sector reversed the 
privatisation trend in the country. In 2003 only 
35 per cent of German municipalities provided 
their own residual waste collection but by 2015 
this had increased to 46 per cent, while PPPs 
decreased (see Figure 4).36  Remunicipalisations 
in the waste sector were especially common in 
cities with more than 100.000 inhabitants - in 92 
per cent of them the local authority is currently in 
charge of the rubbish collection.37  Yet increas-
ingly also rural areas opt for public waste manage-
ment. In addition to waste collection, a report by 
the European Commission found that in Germany 
31 per cent of the waste treatment activities and 
four per cent of the waste recovery activities 
were provided by the municipalities in 2016.38  
FIGURE 4: PERCENTAGE OF MUNICIPAL AND PPP WASTE COLLECTION IN GERMANY
Public waste
collection
provision
PPP
Source : ECA Economics based on Remondis Data
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In the UK, waste collection was the second most 
common remunicipalised public service in recent 
years. This trend of increased insourcing came on 
the back of local authorities grappling with auster-
ity mechanisms and drastic budget cuts and thus 
remunicipalisation provided a solution to achieve 
service efficiency and cost savings.39 
3.3.5. Health and social services
Private companies have become a growing pres-
ence in public healthcare systems across the 
globe. In Europe, cuts to government spending 
have been accompanied by a widespread com-
mercialisation and marketisation of health and 
social care. This has led to greater healthcare ine-
quality because for-profit providers tend to ‘cher-
ry-pick’ wealthy and lower risk patients, whilst 
higher-risk and poorer patients are left to rely on 
the under-resourced public health service provi-
sion that have experienced continuous budget 
cuts.40 
Privatised healthcare features a consistent track 
record of worsened working conditions and pay, 
reduced staff levels, increased workloads and re-
sulting stress on workers, all of which negatively 
impacts on the safety and quality of care. Several 
local and regional authorities have decided to in-
source health and social services. 
 
In South Denmark the regional authority out-
sourced ambulance services, but as the service 
response became slow and put patients at risk, 
it decided to return the service to public provi-
sion (see Case 10. Health Care, Denmark, South 
Denmark).
In the UK the privatisation of hospitals was flawed 
from the start. In 2012 the multinational Circle 
won a ten-year contract to run the National Health 
Service (NHS) Hinchingbrooke hospital, a district 
general hospital in Cambridgeshire, with some 
250 beds and nearly 1,500 staff. It was the first 
NHS hospital in the UK to be handed to a private 
management firm since the NHS was established 
in 1948.41  Upon inspection by the independent 
regulator of health and adult social care in England 
- the Care Quality Commission (CQC) - the service 
was found ‘inadequate’ and liable to put patients 
in danger. As a result, Circle returned the hospital 
to public management in 2015 –seven years be-
fore contract expiry (see Case 12. Health Care, 
UK, Hinchingbrooke). This case is not excep-
tional. The shortest privatisation in the UK might 
have been that of eye surgery in the Musgrave 
Park Hospital where the disaster of privatisation 
became immediately obvious. Dozens of people 
were left with impaired vision, pain and discom-
fort after operations performed by the private 
provider. The privatisation lasted only four days 
(see case 13. HealthCare, UK, Somerset). 
In Australia, after the local community success-
fully organised a campaign for its insourcing, the 
government in Victoria decided in 2019 to take 
its only privately-run hospital back into public 
management as the privatisation had a negative 
impact on the standard of patient care and the 
local community successfully organised a cam-
paign for its insourcing (see Case 8. Health Care, 
Australia, Victoria).42  
In China the provinces of Suqian in Jiangsu and 
Luoyang in Henan recently took steps to reverse 
the process of hospital privatisations due to un-
satisfactory experience in pilot projects with pri-
vatised healthcare. In Suqian hospitals had been 
privatised since 2000 and all the 125 public health 
centres in the city had been negatively affected 
by the privatisation. Most of the health centres 
were bought by individual operators. As profit 
maximisation became the priority a sustainable, 
integrated healthcare system could not be estab-
lished for the province. In Luoyang an inspection 
in 2017 found that the city’s health planning com-
mission had neglected its duties in supervising 
restructured hospitals. Moreover, there seemed 
to be evidence of bribery in the privatisation pro-
cess. Subsequently, the Luoyang government 
began to buy back the privatised public hospi-
tals (see Case 9. Health Care, China Luoyang). 
However, despite the failure of privatised health 
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care in China, a new healthcare reform in China 
suggested that private capital will play a growing 
role, not only in hospitals that are currently run by 
state-owned enterprises, but also in other spe-
cialized health services and in elderly care.43
In Delhi, India the local government introduced 
public healthcare in order to make services more 
affordable and accessible to all. Local community 
clinics, called Mohalla, were set up to provide ba-
sic healthcare services to millions of people (see 
Case 11. Health Care, India, Delhi). 
In the US, the dissatisfaction with the priva-
tised healthcare system, under which 30.4 mil-
lion Americans lacked coverage in 2018, led the 
Democrats to call for a national “Medicare for All” 
programme.44  It highlighted that healthcare is a 
human right and that the only way to ensure uni-
versal access is to bring it back into public owner-
ship and control. Medicare for all has found a high 
level of public support in the US, a recent poll in-
dicates that 70 per cent of residents support it.45  
3.3.6. Other services
Well beyond the sectors mentioned in the earlier 
sections, municipalities have insourced all kinds 
of public services: from cleaning to parking, 
from libraries to funerals, from prisons to beach 
lifeguards. While cost efficiency is a major moti-
vation behind insourcing, it is about much more 
than simply saving money. By bringing the service 
back inhouse the local authority regains control 
over the quality and delivery of the service. In 
many cases this has been the main reason for 
remunicipalising when privatisation failed (see 
for example Case 44. Catering and cleaning, UK, 
Leicester; Case 45. Cleaning, UK, Nottingham; 
Case 50. Prisons, New Zealand, Mt Eden).
Insourcing also provides an opportunity for mu-
nicipalities to redistribute resources and to pur-
sue social and environmental goals directing 
funds where they are needed the most, applying 
a holistic approach within their territories in a spirit 
of solidarity. 
For example, in Barcelona, Spain the local author-
ity decided to create a public funeral company to 
guarantee affordable prices and to enable people 
a dignified end of life as the services of private 
providers were beyond the means of many of the 
city’s inhabitants (see Case 47. Funeral services, 
Spain, Barcelona.) 
Some cities, like Preston in the UK and Cleveland 
in Ohio are putting specific policies in place to 
boost the local economy (see also section 7.2). 
However, as explained in more detail in section 
7.5, localising the economy should not be seen as 
a replacement to remunicipalisation. Outsourcing 
public services to local pro-profit enterprises is 
still a form of privatization.  
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4.1. BENEFITS OF PUBLIC SERVICE 
REMUNICIPALISATION
Publicly owned and controlled public servic-es offer unique opportunities for change. Public ownership is not the end goal but a 
tool for re-creating a society that promotes social 
equality and environmental justice. 
Instead of further enriching the shareholders, 
when public services are publicly operated the 
surpluses can be 
 z reinvested to expand the service infrastructure, 
 z used to improve the quality of the service, 
 z used to lower charges; and/or 
 z reinvested to address climate change. 
When public services are publicly owned and 
controlled it enables holistic and strategic plan-
ning. The cross-subsidy of public services is a 
case in point. This means that the surplus from 
one public service is used to subsidise another 
service, which does not cover its costs through 
user charges. Examples might include parks, lidos 
4. 
: 
: 
: 
: Using remunicipalisation to 
build public services that work 
for communities, workers and 
the environment
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or public transport. In Munich, Germany the pub-
lic transport system is in part financed by its pub-
licly owned and controlled energy system and the 
cooperation between public transport and pubic 
energy does not stop there. Through public own-
ership Munich created an energy system that ena-
bles the whole public transport network to be run 
on renewable energy.1  
Resources can be redistributed when public ser-
vices are in public hands. Consequently, inequali-
ties such as energy poverty and the access of the 
rural population to public transport can be better 
addressed. In this way, public services can benefit 
everyone. From a trade union perspective, public 
ownership also presents an opportunity to enable 
a just transition to a decarbonised economy that 
has worker interest at heart. For example, when 
wind farms are publicly owned strategic choices 
can be made to situate them not just where there 
is wind, but also in cities and regions that are, or 
will be particularly affected by, de-industrialisation 
through the phasing out of coal or nuclear energy. 
Furthermore, remunicipalisation can function as a 
basis for progressive and innovative employment 
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Australia’s People’s Inquiry: a parent gives evidence to the Inquiry’s panel about the impact of 
privatisation of Aged, Disability and Home Care (ADHC) on social housing and group homes.
©Australia’s People’s Inquiry’s
policies such as a shorter working week, and the 
provision of equal opportunities as well as invest-
ment in skills and training.
4.2. BENEFITS FOR CITIZENS, 
SERVICE USERS AND COMMUNITIES 
Remunicipalisations offer opportunities for pro-
gressive change and public service innovation. It 
is about providing services that serve the public 
good, that tailor resources to all aspects of pub-
lic life to (re)build communities and to achieve 
greater service access and quality to all. Rather 
than prioritising profit and shareholder returns as 
the main indicator of service efficiency, public-
ly owned and run services can prioritise service 
quality and access – as well as social and environ-
mental indicators – as proxies for efficiency. 
An example of the positive social impact of re-
municipalisation can be found in Kerala, a state in 
South West India with 36 million inhabitants. The 
remunicipalisation of primary education changed 
the future of a whole generation. In 2016 there 
were around 1000 private - but publicly subsidised 
- schools that faced closure, as the private pro-
viders could no longer guarantee a profit. A 
movement for public schooling and a change in 
government after a coalition of left parties won 
the Kerala state elections in May 2016, changed 
Kerala’s education policy to support the remunic-
ipalisation of private schools that were running 
a deficit. Consequently, in August 2017, student 
numbers went up for the first time in a decade: 
12,198 more students enrolled in class one and 
16,710 more students joined classes two to nine 
compared to the previous year. This was signifi-
cant as previously student numbers had been 
falling year after year (see Case 46. Education, 
India, Kerala).2 
Privatised public services often either exclude 
poor communities or, ironically, make the poor 
pay the most for the service. In the UK for exam-
ple, those on low incomes are more likely to be 
reliant on electricity purchased through pre-pay-
ment meters, which are substantially more ex-
pensive than electricity paid for through online 
direct debits. To address this inequality and to 
lift people out of energy poverty in Nottingham 
U
S
I
N
G
 
R
E
M
U
N
I
C
I
P
A
L
I
S
A
T
I
O
N
 
T
O
 
B
U
I
L
D
 
P
U
B
L
I
C
 
S
E
R
V
I
C
E
S
 
T
H
A
T
 
W
O
R
K
 
F
O
R
 
C
O
M
M
U
N
I
T
I
E
S
,
 
W
O
R
K
E
R
S
 
A
N
D
 
T
H
E
 
E
N
V
I
R
O
N
M
E
N
T
 
TAKING OUR PUBLIC SERVICES BACK IN HOUSE28
the City Council launched Robin Hood Energy in 
2015 - the first not-for-profit energy company run 
by a local authority.3  Before the creation of Robin 
Hood Energy fuel poverty in Nottingham affected 
15 per cent of the population – one of the high-
est rates in England.4  Robin Hood Energy aimed 
to make energy cheaper to lift people out of fuel 
poverty and did so. On average, Nottingham res-
idents save £315 a year with Robin Hood Energy 
(see Case 6: Energy, Nottingham).
4.3. BENEFITS FOR WORKERS 
Research on privatisation has shown that it has 
a negative effect on public service employment.5  
For example, ten privatisations of US water and 
waste water in Atlanta between 1999 and 2005, 
led to an average job losses of 34 per cent.6 In 
the UK almost half of all jobs in the British elec-
tricity industry disappeared after privatisation.7 By 
reversing outsourcing and workplace fragmenta-
tion, remunicipalisation can provide a framework 
that is more conducive to collective bargaining, 
creating better opportunities to win adequate ser-
vice staffing levels, better pay and working con-
ditions, health and safety, access to career devel-
opment and stronger workers rights. 
One example of where remunicipalisation has 
helped to improve pay and conditions include 
can be found in Conception Bay South, Canada. 
The Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE), 
advocated tirelessly for the remunicipalisation of 
the waste collection services.8 In 2011 the union’s 
longstanding campaign paid off: the service was 
remunicipalised after three decades of outsourc-
ing. The difference for the workers was enormous: 
waste workers in Conception Bay South now re-
ceive sick pay and health and safety practices 
have improved as the municipality provides more 
and better equipment. Remunicipalised waste 
workers now have to lift 40 percent less, since 
service was taken back in-house.9 Better working 
conditions have led to increased resident satis-
faction. While the rate of complaints was very high 
before the remunicipalisation, in a recent survey 
of residents run by the municipality, over 80 per 
cent rated the waste collection service one of the 
key things they liked about their city10 (see Case 
23 Waste, Canada, Conception Bay South). 
A similar development was seen in Oslo, 
Norway. The bankruptcy of the private company 
contracted for municipal waste services led to 
the remunicipalisation of the service in four mu-
nicipalities northeast of the capital. The four mu-
nicipalities co-own an inter-municipal company, 
Sirkula, which is responsible for handling and 
collecting waste from 41,000 households in the 
region. During the privatisation the workers were 
subjected to very precarious employment con-
ditions, low pay and in some cases wage theft 
and long working hours. The remunicipalisation 
led to higher wages, better working conditions, 
more job security through permanent contracts 
for the workers and increased union member-
ship in the remunicipalised Oslo waste service. 
The predominantly migrant workforce also ben-
efited from Norwegian language classes through 
their union, Fagforbundet (see Case 29, Waste, 
Norway, Oslo).
Similarly, in Croydon, a local authority in Greater 
London, UK, library services were remunicipalised 
after Carillion – a British multinational and a main 
contractor of public services in the UK – went 
bankrupt in the beginning of 2018. This resulted 
in a pay raise for the staff, who were previously 
on poverty wages. The workers now receive the 
London Living Wage, which is independently 
calculated by the University of Loughborough to 
meet the real cost of living in London (see Case 
48 Library Services, UK, Croydon). In Liverpool, 
UK, poor quality services and growing contract 
costs in waste collection, highways maintenance, 
street cleaning and parks led to a remunicipalisa-
tion through a wholly-owned municipal company, 
which was supported by the trade unions. This 
led to better pay and pensions and a staff devel-
opment programme, as well as additional jobs for 
the local community.
In Germany, Rostock’s remunicipalisation of wa-
ter in July 2018 led to better working conditions 
and pay for the workers. As part of a transitional 
collective bargaining agreement, the workers re-
ceive bonuses in the first two years and benefit 
from a six-year long protection against redundan-
cies. The agreement also includes a safeguard 
clause protecting the workers against outsourc-
ing without the consultation and approval of the 
trade union. The pay increased on average by 
300€ per month (see Case 38, Water, Germany, 
Rostock). 
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The benefits of remunicipalisation can also extend 
beyond victories for existing union members. 
The trade union movement can be strengthened 
when trade unions promote good working condi-
tions for all workers -not just for their members - 
and the creation of new, quality jobs for the local 
community. For example, in Grenoble, France, the 
2001 water remunicipalisation led to an increase 
in the number of workers. This was in addition 
to the 82 workers transferred from a semi-priva-
tised company to the new public operator REG at 
the moment of remunicipalisation (see Case 35. 
Water, France, Grenoble).11  In New Zealand the 
nationalisation of Mount Eden prison meant that 
50 additional staff members were employed (see 
Case 50. Prisons, New Zealand, Mount Eden). 
In Colombia’s capital Bogotá, the remunicipal-
isation of the waste collection service in 2012 
was accompanied by the formal recognition of 
the informal waste workers (recicladores) - who 
make a living by selling the recyclable materi-
al collected from the waste. When Bogotá pri-
vatised its waste services in 1996, the private 
companies excluded the recicladores from the 
system, as the contractors were paid per ton of 
waste trucked to the landfill - a system that was 
not only bad for the workers, but also for the en-
vironment as it discouraged recycling.12 Within 
two years of the remunicipalisation, 20 per cent 
of the recicladores- 8112 workers – had become 
registered and doubled their income to approxi-
mately US$200 a month.13  As such, the process 
of remunicipalisation in Bogotá brought better 
pay, dignity and respect to a whole section of the 
workforce that was previously excluded as well 
as environmental benefits. Unfortunately, the re-
municipalisation was only of short duration as the 
next mayor, Enrique Peñalosa, re-privatised the 
service in February 2018 (see Case 26, Waste, 
Columbia, Bogotá).14 
4.4. BENEFITS FOR LOCAL 
AUTHORITIES
Another reason to remunicipalise a public service 
is that it is usually cheaper as public money is not 
lost by paying out dividends to shareholders and 
the cost of borrowing is lower when the loan is 
from a public bank rather than when money is 
borrowed as private capital on the financial mar-
kets. Moreover, savings and profits made from 
the service can be re-invested to secure service 
maintenance and improve quality. As such re-
municipalisation can be an opportunity for local 
authorities to provide public services at a lower 
cost while maintaining control over service deliv-
ery and quality. Remunicipalisation therefore ap-
pears especially relevant local authorities in times 
of austerity and budget cuts. 
Cost benefits have been the main motivation be-
hind several remunicipalisations. For example, in 
Bergkamen, Germany, the mayor commissioned 
a local authority working group to calculate the 
costs of remunicipalisation when the contract 
with private waste service provider Remondis 
came to an end. The working group conclud-
ed that remunicipalisation could reduce costs 
for the municipality by 30 per cent. This was in-
deed achieved in 2010, four years on from the 
remunicipalisation, while the service quality was 
maintained. This was simply done by recovering 
the profit Remondis creamed off (see Case 28. 
Waste, Germany, Bergkamen).15  
In 2001 Cumbria County Council signed one of 
the first major PPPs for highways and road main-
tenance in the UK. When the contract terminated 
in 2011, Cumbria decided to take the services for 
highway and road maintenance back in-house. It 
is estimated that Cumbria has saved £1.8 million 
a year since then. Moreover, the local authority 
can now better respond to natural disasters such 
as floods, which are not uncommon in England’s 
Lake District (see Case 15. Infrastructure, UK, 
Cumbria Case).16  Other cases where the local au-
thority benefited from cost savings are Case 29. 
Waste, Norway, Oslo; Case 36. Water, France, 
Paris.
Insourcing is providing the means for local coun-
cils to direct resources to where they are need-
ed.17  By delivering quality public services through 
public ownership and direct management rather 
than via private operators, local authorities can 
improve their reputation and image with citi-
zens and service users.  A recent report by the 
Association for Public Service Excellence (APSE) 
in the UK outlined that quality of service delivery 
is a driving factor for insourcing alongside costs.18 
Insourcing public services gives local authorities 
and national governments control over the service 
and thus the service quality can be prioritised. 
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For example, in New Zealand, the govern-
ment re-nationalised the Mount Eden prison in 
Auckland in July 2015 after a series of scandals 
including weekly organised fight clubs, and drug 
consumption that were the result of understaff-
ing.19 In 2011 the government had handed over 
the management to the British outsourcing com-
pany Serco. The service had subsequently dete-
riorated. When the government’s Department of 
Corrections took over the management of the 
prison in 2015, it made immediate improvements, 
and increased the staffing levels. Consequently, a 
55 per cent drop in serious assaults among pris-
oners was achieved and prisoners reported that 
they felt a lot safer after the renationalisation (see 
Case 50. Prisons, New Zealand, Mount Eden).20  
4.5. BENEFITS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT
Public ownership is crucial in addressing climate 
change. By insourcing services local authorities 
have more scope to use resources sustainably 
so that future generations can benefit from clean 
water and energy and a habitable environment. 
Remunicipalisation also offers opportunities to 
depart from the extractivism of private companies 
that exploit natural resources to sell them on the 
world market. Through public ownership sustain-
able resource management that puts the environ-
ment before profit becomes possible. 
Throughout the world there is evidence that the 
marketisation of public services is often at odds 
with environmental protection. For example, in 
Bogotá, Columbia when the local government 
privatised the waste management service in 1996 
the contractors were paid per ton of waste trucked 
to the landfill. In other words, the more waste was 
buried in the landfill the more profit for the private 
providers. Such a system not only discourages re-
cycling but it also had detrimental consequences 
for the informal waste workers (recicladores) who 
search the waste for recyclables before it entered 
the landfills since private companies often vio-
lently excluded them from the landfill sites.21  
In Europe, strategies to decarbonise energy are 
incompatible with energy liberalisation policies 
that encourage more private sector participation 
in the energy sector. It has become clear that 
without protection, renewable energy cannot 
survive in the competitive electricity markets. 
The rise of renewable energy in Europe was only 
possible because it was protected from market 
liberalisation. By reclaiming public control over 
the power sector decarbonisation can be priori-
tised and necessary investments can be made to 
make the transmission grid fit for the purpose of 
integrating renewable energy.22 
Similarly, in the water sector privatisation is at odds 
with environmental imperatives. For example, in 
Jakarta, Indonesia the privatisation of water has 
led tariffs to increase by over 300 per cent,23 
around 40 per cent of the city still does not have 
access to piped water and those that do receive 
poor quality water. Cuts to the water supply are 
frequent, the water often smells, causes skin ir-
ritations and is sometimes muddy. Consequently, 
hotels and wealthier residents started to dig their 
own private deep wells to secure pure ground wa-
ter. This has caused Jakarta to sink - faster than 
any other large city on the planet - and 40 per 
cent of the city is already below sea level. In just 
ten years from now, North Jakarta, which is home 
to millions of residents, could be under water 
(see Case 39. Water, Indonesia, Jakarta). 
Remunicipalisation gives local administrations 
more leverage and autonomy to put greater em-
phasis on greening the service. Trade unions can 
work together with local authorities to enshrine 
effective environmental protection practices 
when remunicipalising the service. For example, 
in Port Moody, Canada, when a five-year waste 
collection contract was due to expire in 2008, the 
trade union Canadian Union of Public Employees 
(CUPE) formed a joint task force together with the 
municipalities management team to think through 
the costs and benefits of remunicipalising the 
service. Based on the research of the taskforce 
the council voted to insource the service. In 
preparation for the transition to the new collec-
tion system, the municipality, CUPE and the waste 
workers worked together to educate residents 
about recycling. Consequently, the city’s commu-
nication strategy not only earned an award from 
the Solid Waste Association of North America 
(SWANA), but recycling rates rose from less than 
50 per cent when the service was privately run 
to 75 per cent after the remunicipalisation. Port 
Moody’s recycling rates are now among the high-
est in Canada. The service improved considerably 
while it charges lower fees than its neighbouring 
communities (see Case 24. Waste, Canada, Port 
Moody).
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5. 
: 
: 
Remunicipalisation:  
A Worker and Trade Union Issue
R
E
M
U
N
I
C
I
P
A
L
I
S
A
T
I
O
N
:
 
A
 
W
O
R
K
E
R
 
A
N
D
 
T
R
A
D
E
 
U
N
I
O
N
 
I
S
S
U
E
 
5.1. WHY REMUNICIPALISATION IS A 
TRADE UNION ISSUE
Remunicipalisation is a trade union issue. Campaigns to return public services to public control and management allow 
trade unions to re-open discussions about the 
values and capacity of the public sector to pro-
vide quality public services. Remunicipalisation is 
an opportunity to rethink the ways in which public 
services are provided and to explore the linkages 
between publicly owned and managed services 
and the living and working conditions of public 
sector workers. 
Remunicipalisation also generates a chance to 
overcome the ‘two tier’ workforce in public ser-
vices. In high income countries in particular, the 
trend to privatise and outsource key public ser-
vices has led to a divided workforce, in which 
directly employed public sector workers have 
higher job security, better terms and conditions 
and relatively stable bargaining structures com-
pared to their outsourced colleagues. Directly 
employed public sector workers are also more 
likely to be unionised.1  When services are priva-
tised, public sector trade unions often lose their 
bargaining status. Consequently, privatisation has 
also been a significant factor in reducing union 
membership and union density. In other words, it 
has served to weaken union power.2  The nega-
tive impact of privatisation on pay and conditions 
is especially severe in places where public sector 
collective agreements are not applied to priva-
tised contracts.3 
While privatisation has often caused trade unions 
to lose membership, remunicipalisation offers op-
portunities to reverse this trend (see also section 
6.4 and Case 29 Waste Norway, Oslo; Case 38. 
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Fagforbundet local shop stewards approach Vereino workers to organize them into the union ahead of the 
imminent Oslo waste remunicipalisation. Photo credit: Fagforbundet
Water, Germany, Rostock). However, remunic-
ipalisation does not automatically translate into 
increased unionisation and better working condi-
tions. To ensure remunicipalisation benefits pub-
lic service workers, trade unions need to carefully 
plan their strategy and campaigns. Best results 
are achieved if the workers themselves are not 
only informed but involved in the remunicipali-
sation process from the earliest stage possible. 
When trade unions negotiate a fair transition for 
all workers involved in the remunicipalisation - re-
gardless of whether they are members or not – 
public sector insourcing can be used as a tool for 
trade union vitalisation.4 
It is also essential that trade unions work close-
ly with service users and community groups in-
volved in the remunicipalisation campaigns. 
Insourcing services will not automatically improve 
the service quality - especially where public 
funding is restricted. As such it is essential that 
workers, service users and the communities use 
the opportunity to re-organise services to better 
meet the needs of users as well as workers.
5.2. DOCUMENTING AND EXPOSING THE 
DAMAGES OF PRIVATISATION
Faith in liberalised markets remains strong. Many 
economists and international institutions, such as 
the World Bank, the IMF but also the European 
Commission, retain neoliberal policies, that pro-
mote flexibilisation, deregulation and privatisation 
to extend the influence of the market and to pro-
mote capital exchanges across borders.5  Against 
this backdrop a first step consists in changing the 
narrative around privatisation and exposing its 
negative impact on workers, service users and 
communities (see for example Case 25: Waste 
Canada Winnipeg; Case 29 Waste Norway, Oslo, 
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Case 8 Health Care, Australia, Victoria; Case 33. 
Water, Bolivia, Cochabamba; Case 37. Water, 
Germany, Berlin; Case 40. Italy Turin and Box 
3: Australia’s People Inquiry into Privatisation 
2016).
It is particularly difficult to promote public own-
ership when countries face pressure to privatise 
based on donor conditionality of bail out agree-
ments. This is a lesson that can be learnt from 
Cameroon, one of the first African countries that 
privatised parts of its waste management ser-
vices.6  In 1969, Douala had already outsourced 
the management of its municipal waste services 
and Yaoundé followed ten years later. The United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) clas-
sified this privatisation as a “failed PPP”.7  The 
performance of the private waste companies was 
poor and eventually the World Bank intervened in 
1994 with an emergency programme to clean up 
the two cities and in particular manage the open 
dumps. However, despite the problems, the orig-
inal company HYSACAM was re-contracted and 
the PPPs were expanded to 17 other cities across 
the country.8  Yet again, HYSACAM’s performance 
was inadequate. Five years into the contract the 
company still could not access 60 per cent of the 
neighbourhoods, as the pathways were too nar-
row for their equipment and these areas continued 
to be serviced by informal workers.9   After nearly 
50 years of privatised waste services an efficient 
and effective waste management system has still 
not been introduced in Cameroon. Despite this 
dramatic failure the Cameroonian government is 
still contracting private waste operators and is 
currently in the process of re-tendering.10   
Such examples shows that the failures of priva-
tisation, even when strikingly obvious, are often 
not enough to promote the insourcing of the 
service. It is therefore vital for remunicipalisation 
campaigners to move beyond a narrative that 
highlights the failure of privatisation by creating a 
positive counter vision that illustrates what can be 
achieved through public alternatives grounded in 
public ownership and democratic control. 
5.3. BUILDING COMMUNITY CAMPAIGNS 
TO REVERSE PRIVATISATION 
The deterioration of working conditions not only 
takes its toll on workers, but also on the quali-
ty of the service and hence service users face 
negative consequences. Studies have shown 
that there is a correlation between the worsen-
ing of working conditions due to privatisation and 
a reduced quality of the service.11  It is therefore 
essential that trade unions and community cam-
paigns join forces to reclaim public services. 
Supporting remunicipalisation can also help trade 
unions to build broader alliances with a potential 
to strengthen progressive civil society move-
ments and to demonstrate the power of trade un-
ionism, especially to those not engaged with the 
labour movement. In this way, wider remunicipal-
isation campaigns can contribute to build a pos-
itive perception of trade unions within commu-
nities by showing concretely that their role goes 
beyond bread and butter issues and that they play 
a role in enforcing human and social rights such 
as promoting public service quality, user access 
and the protection of the commons.
Much can be learnt from campaigns for the re-
municipalisation of water where workers and 
service users unite around shared goals and 
narratives. In Italy in 2006, the Italian Forum of 
Water Movements was established to campaign 
for a referendum against the privatisation of wa-
ter in June 2011. Its founders were Attac Italy, the 
Comitati di Base (Cobas) trade union and CICMA 
(Italian Committee for World Water Contract)12. 
Funzione Pubblica (FPCGIL), Italy’s largest trade 
union federation organising public sector workers 
also joined the campaign. Various environmental 
groups, including the World Wildlife Fund for Nature 
(WWF) Italia, religious groups such as the Catholic 
network of social centres ACLI (Associazioni 
Cristiane dei Lavoratori Italiani) and the consum-
er association Federconsumatori13  also became 
coalition members. Building an alliance among 
such a wide range of civil society, community and 
trade union groups became possible by focusing 
on one key shared principle - water as a human 
right. The movement’s common position was that 
water should not be treated as a commodity out 
of which private companies could make profit, 
but as a common good that should remain in pub-
lic hands.14 The Italian Forum of Water Movements 
won a huge victory when it launched - and won - a 
national referendum against water privatisation in 
June 2011.15  
Campaigns for water remunicipalisation in sev-
eral EU member states sparked a movement for 
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public water across Europe. In 2013, nearly 1.9 
million European citizens across 28 European 
Union Member States signed the European 
Citizens’ Initiative (ECI), “Water and sanitation 
are a human right! Water is a public good, not 
a commodity!”. This was the first ever successful 
European Citizens’ Initiative, calling for a halt to 
liberalisation and commercialisation as a means to 
strengthen the human right to water. The ECI was 
promoted by EPSU, ETUC and PSI, together with 
a host of international associations and networks 
of public water operators, environmental organi-
sations, women’s and health organisations.16  The 
ECI forced the European Commission to officially 
respond to the demands of campaigners and it 
was also the object of a supportive resolution by 
the European Parliament.17 
  
In Jakarta, Indonesia a broad coalition demand-
ing the remunicipalisation of water in Jakarta was 
founded in 2011, that consisted of trade unions 
and civil society organisations. Women’s groups 
played a leading role in the coalition as inadequate 
water services particularly affected women since 
they were primarily responsible for household 
access to water. Environmental groups were also 
involved as the lack of access to quality piped 
water meant that residents had to dig their own 
wells, contributing to environmental damage (see 
also section 4.5 and Case 39. Water, Indonesia, 
Jakarta).
In Australia, trade unionists and civil society organ-
isations came together to challenge the dominant 
practices and discourse on privatisation. They 
organised a ‘People’s Inquiry into Privatisation’ 
which created a cohesive and factual narrative 
on how privatisation harmed workers, service us-
ers, families and communities. The Inquiry mod-
elled the practice of the Australian government, 
through which people are invited to speak be-
fore the Senate and take part in a Question and 
Answer session by the inquiry’s panel. Through 
the People’s Inquiry into Privatisation trade un-
ionists gained knowledge on the impact of pri-
vatisation and engaged and educated commu-
nities and members on its failure. Ultimately, the 
People’s Inquiry solidified a cohesive narrative on 
why the privatisation of public services should 
be rejected and influenced public policy despite 
a hostile, pro-privatisation environment (see Box 
3: Australia’s People Inquiry into Privatisation 
2016).
5.4. PROMOTING PUBLIC AUTHORITY 
SUPPORT FOR REMUNICIPALISATION
Local mayors and politicians can be powerful al-
lies for trade unions when it comes to winning 
support for remunicipalisation.18  For example, in 
Bergen, Norway the trade union Fagforbundet 
built important links with local politicians in antic-
ipation of remunicipalisation opportunities. From 
2014 onwards Fagforbundet started to meet reg-
ularly with the Norwegian Labour party to prepare 
for the upcoming 2015 municipal elections and 
to put remunicipalisation on the political agenda. 
When the Labour party came into power as part 
of a local coalition government their lobby work 
paid off.19  In May 2016 two elderly care homes, in 
fact the only two out of around 40 in the area that 
were privately managed, were remunicipalised 
(see Case 18. Social Care, Norway, Bergen).20  
Fagforbundet also put remunicipalisation on the 
local political agenda in Oslo, Norway after the 
bankruptcy of two waste management compa-
nies, Veireno and RenoNorden in 2017. The trade 
union successfully lobbied politicians and en-
gaged in a press campaign highlighting the failure 
of privatisation and putting forward arguments for 
public ownership (see Case 29. Waste, Norway, 
Oslo).21    
In Canada the trade union CUPE used the mo-
mentum of a report it had commissioned to ex-
pose the labour and human rights violations in 
Winnipeg’s privatised waste management.22  On 
the back of this public reputational damage of the 
municipality the union CUPE also demonstrated to 
the Mayor and the Chair of the Water and Waste 
Committee that other municipalities in Canada, 
which have publicly run waste management sys-
tems, delivered a much better service and paved 
the way for the partial remunicipalisation of the 
waste service (See Case 25: Waste, Canada, 
Winnipeg).
In 2012 in Bogotá, Colombia Gustavo Petro won 
the election to become mayor. In his election 
campaign Petro had received support from the 
informal waste worker’s movement seeking rec-
ognition in the local waste management system.23  
Once in power one of the first programmes he 
implemented was a zero-waste campaign, which 
included the informal waste workers in the for-
mal waste management system of the city.  Petro 
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also sought to remunicipalise the municipal waste 
service. However, the private companies that 
previously ran the service vehemently resisted 
the remunicipalisation. A long battle eventually 
ended with the remunicipalisation of the waste 
collection in half of Bogotá, which, however, was 
reversed by Petro’s successor  (see Case 26. 
Waste, Columbia, Bogotá).
However, mayors and local politicians can also 
oppose remunicipalisation. For example, in 
Hamburg, Germany in response to a campaign 
to remunicipalise the energy grid through a ref-
erendum an anti-remunicipalisation campaign was 
organised. The anti-remunicipalisation campaign 
was backed by the major, the private companies 
and also the largest political parties that encour-
aged citizens to vote against a public energy grid. 
(see Case 2: Hamburg). 
A 2012 study of social resistance against water 
privatisation in Latin America found that political 
parties and politicians can at times be unreliable 
allies in civic campaigns. For example, in Uruguay, 
an opposition party that supported a referendum 
campaign opposed the implementation of the ref-
erendum result once it was elected into govern-
ment. In Cartagena, Colombia, a politician who 
supported remunicipalisation as a candidate for 
the office of mayor, opposed it after being elect-
ed. This was partly because of the World Bank’s 
lending conditions, which made water privatisa-
tion a condition for the disbursement of a loan.24 
5.5. MAINTAINING UNION COHESION 
Union membership in public services can be 
fragmented across various and sometimes even 
competing trade unions. When privatisation and 
outsourcing cover only parts of the service, trade 
union membership might reflect and be divided 
by a private-public split. Consequently, workers 
might be covered by different collective bargain-
ing agreements and thus represented by differ-
ent unions or might be excluded from collective 
bargaining coverage. It is therefore important that 
trade unions approach organising around remu-
nicipalisation in a holistic manner and avoid com-
peting with each other.25 
In Rostock, Germany the trade union represent-
ing the private sector workers mobilised against 
the remunicipalisation of water as this would have 
meant that the workers would be shifted to the 
jurisdiction of the public sector trade union and 
the trade union would therefore have incurred a 
membership loss (see Case 38, Water, Germany, 
Rostock). However, by campaigning against in-
sourcing - especially if done against the will of the 
service workers - trade unions can damage their 
reputation, which may have long-lasting negative 
consequences that go beyond membership loss. 
For this reason, trade unions directly or indirectly 
affected by a remunicipalisation process should 
seek opportunities for dialogue and collaboration. 
Through open discussions the different trade un-
ions might be able to find shared solutions that 
also have the public interest at heart. 
It is also important for trade unions to inform, con-
sult and support workers throughout the insourc-
ing process and well before the remunicipalisation 
takes place to mitigate trade union fragmentation. 
In Paris, France, before water was remunicipal-
ised the unions involved produced pamphlets 
and other information materials to explain to the 
affected workers how the service would oper-
ate under public ownership (see Case 36 Water, 
France, Paris).26  
5.6. CHECKING THE LEGAL AND 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FRAMEWORKS 
Remunicipalisation implies the transfer of a pub-
lic service from a private into a public regime. 
According to the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, public ser-
vices fall outside of the scope of the EU compe-
tition rules. The privatisation of public services is 
therefore not enforced by the EU itself, but it is 
left to the choice of individual member states.27 
Nonetheless, the EU Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 
March 2001 ensures that in the case of ownership 
change or transfer of undertakings  from private 
to public, public to private, or private to private 
workers are entitled to the same terms and con-
ditions under which they were employed prior to 
the transfer “until the date of termination or expiry 
of the collective agreement or the entry into force 
or application of another collective agreement”.28  
This law has been used by workers and their un-
ions as a protection from inferior conditions fol-
lowing privatisation. However, the Directive only 
provides a temporary protection and does not 
prevent the new employer from subsequently 
reducing the headcount or changing terms and 
conditions, particularly of new recruits.29  
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In most EU countries the legislation on workers’ 
transfer are in line with the European Directive 
2001/23/EC. In the UK, the remunicipalisation 
of a service will commonly invoke the Transfer of 
Undertakings Protection of Employment regula-
tions (TUPE), which mandates that the terms and 
conditions of employment for transferred workers 
are protected under a new employer. Insourcing 
also falls under the remit of TUPE.30  
Where the European Directive 2001/23/EC con-
flicts with national legislation on the transfers of 
undertaking EU law takes precedence. In a recent 
case in Portugal it was shown that according to 
the national law in the event of a transfer the em-
ployees concerned must first undergo a public 
competitive selection procedure. However, the 
courts ruled that the European Directive 2001/23/
EC precluded the national law.31   In Italy, obsta-
cles exist to the transfer of workers into a full-
fledged public service as Art. 97 of the Italian 
Constitutions says “employment in public admin-
istration is accessed through competitive exami-
nations”.32  This creates a situation where workers 
transitioning from a private to a public service can 
be required to sit a public competition to keep the 
same job when their service is remunicipalised. 
Most European countries have supplemented as-
pects of the European Directive 2001/23/EC and 
some countries have developed specific legisla-
tion with regard to insourcing. In France, Article 
L5211-4-1 of the French General Code of Local 
Government Administrations guarantees the main-
tenance of pay levels and working conditions dur-
ing the transfer for a minimum of one year, while 
collective bargaining takes place. However, as 
French legislation mandates that local authorities 
do not have the right to create new bodies that 
have full-fledged public service status, the trans-
ferred employees do not become fully integrated 
into the public service but remain under a spe-
cial private sector regime, a so-called Industrial 
and Commercial Public Establishment (EPIC). This 
means that employees are under a private law 
regime in a public sector company (régie pub-
lique) and subsequently are neither covered by 
the private sector collective agreement nor by 
the statutes of the relevant local authority. They 
do not enjoy the same level of job protection and 
do not have permanent positions (fonctionnaires 
titularisés) as fully fledged public servants. This 
demonstrates that when insourcing occurs it is 
especially important that trade unions negotiate 
strong collective bargaining agreements as the 
workers have very little protection guaranteed by 
the law.33  
5.7. SECURING A FAIR DEAL FOR 
WORKERS 
Even when clear legal rules exist for workers’ 
transitions from private to public services, trade 
unions will necessarily have to seek negotiations 
with responsible public authorities to ensure all 
workers get a fair deal under remunicipalisation. 
Negotiations with public authorities should not be 
taken for granted, especially in countries where 
workers and labour rights in the public sector are 
curtailed.34 
It is crucial for trade unions to carefully consider 
well in advance the future implications of remu-
nicipalisation without assuming that all workers, 
citizens and users will automatically get a better 
deal with insourcing. This is why trade unions 
should involve their members in the process early 
on and engage constructively with their concerns 
when joining a remunicipalisation campaign.
The staff in the care homes in Bergen, Norway, 
feared that the proposed remunicipalisation 
would negatively affect their wages, but the op-
posite happened: when the municipality took 
them over in 2016, the staff got higher wages 
and a new pension scheme was introduced that 
left workers better off (see Case 17. Social Care, 
Norway Bergen).35  
However, it is crucial to bear in mind that the tran-
sition from the private to the public service does 
not automatically equate to better working condi-
tions, status and employment protection. In some 
cases, the take home pay of workers may actually 
be reduced by shifting into the public sector. In 
Bergkamen, Germany despite the fact that the 
remunicipalisation led to wage increases of 18 per 
cent, the workers had earned on average more 
when the service was run by the private company 
Remondis as they were working six days a week 
and paid overtime for working weekends. After 
the remunicipalisation workers were employed 
for five days a week.36  While this reduced the 
worker’s income it had a positive impact on their 
wellbeing and absence due to illness became 
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relatively low.  Employees report that the remu-
nicipalisation created a positive working environ-
ment which is also reflected in the low staff turn-
over with only two people leaving since 200637 
(see Case 24. Waste, Germany, Bergkamen).
Lastly, it is crucial that trade unions start as soon 
as possible to organise remunicipalising workers 
so that strong collective bargaining agreements 
are secured to guarantee a fair transition and 
good working conditions. In this way, trade un-
ions can also avoid membership loss and increase 
union density. In Rostock, Germany, the unioni-
sation of the water workers increased by around 
30 per cent as part of the remunicipalisation pro-
cess (see Case 38, Water, Germany, Rostock). 
Similarly, in Oslo, Norway the remunicipalisation 
of waste services led to higher union member-
ship and the organisation of migrant workers (see 
Case 29, Waste, Norway, Oslo). 
5.8. TRANSFERRING CAPACITY, SKILLS 
AND KNOW-HOW TO RUN THE IN-SOURCED 
SERVICE EFFECTIVELY
A common side effect of privatisation is that the 
municipalities lose the skills and the know-how as 
well as the machinery and equipment necessary 
to operate public services. Private providers are 
aware of this and often use the municipalities de-
pendency on them to their advantage. 
In Winnipeg, Canada the fact that privatisation 
meant that the municipality had lost all the tools, 
especially trucks, as well as staff and compe-
tences to run the service was used by the pri-
vate provider as an excuse to increase the prices 
of running the service (see Case 25: Winnipeg, 
Canada). This dependency on private providers 
to deliver a service also means that remunicipali-
sations need to be well prepared so that the ser-
vice can run smoothly as soon as the transition is 
completed. 
In Bogotá, Colombia, the private provider took ad-
vantage of the city’s lack of equipment and used 
this to attempt to prevent the remunicipalisation 
of the waste collection service. Immediately after 
the Mayor Gustavo Petro announced that the city 
would insource the waste collection service in six 
months’ time, the private providers stopped op-
erating the service demanding that the city con-
tinued with privatisation and grant them another 
long-term contract.38  Consequently, the rubbish 
was not collected for four days as the munic-
ipality had not yet the trucks needed to deliver 
the service itself. Eventually, a compromise was 
reached: the private contractors would still be 
responsible for 47 per cent of the collection and 
disposal of municipal solid waste, while Aqua de 
Bogotá, the municipal water utility, took care of 
over half of the service (see Case 26. Waste, 
Columbia, Bogotá).39 
 
In Paris, France when the water supply was remu-
nicipalised after 25 years of privatisation the local 
authority no longer had all the necessary equip-
ment and human resources to make the service 
immediately operational. The company had kept 
the telephones, computers, vehicles and other 
equipment. Moreover, many of the employees 
and managers who were retained by the private 
employers and did not transfer to Eau de Paris 
had some of the strategic skills required to cover 
the tasks necessary to run the service after the 
transition. Consequently, the remunicipalised util-
ity had to make great efforts to rebuild its full op-
erational capacity (see Case 36. Water, France, 
Paris). 
These experiences demonstrate the importance 
of planning well ahead of remunicipalisation to 
ensure that the transferred workers have the skill 
and the equipment to properly deliver the pub-
lic service shortly after it is returned under pub-
lic control. Workers have valuable on-the-ground 
knowledge important to facilitate a smooth transi-
tion of the service back into public ownership and 
control. Trade unions and local authorities have a 
shared interest in collaborating to ensure that the 
service handover goes well and to end the ser-
vice dependency on private providers.40 
In Rostock, Germany the private company, 
Remondis, tried everything in its power to pre-
vent the remunicipalisation of water services as 
the contract had strategic importance for the 
company’s marketing plan. Firstly, Remondis tried 
and failed to sue the city over the remunicipali-
sation. It then negotiated very hard; eventually 
making an offer that would have meant that the 
company would actually make a loss from oper-
ating the service. When all of this did not work 
it obstructed a smooth handover to the public 
authority by not giving the new public company, 
Nordwasser, access to the information it needed 
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for the takeover, including the human resources 
data. This spread fears among employees that 
Nordwasser would not be able to provide respon-
sible human resources management. However, 
their union, Ver.di, ensured a smooth transition 
by encouraging transferred workers to voluntarily 
register with Nordwasser so that the public utility 
would have all the human resource data it needed 
to ensure a functioning service from day one (see 
Case 38. Water, Germany, Rostock). 
In Oslo, Norway the union, Fagforbundet, worked 
together with the local authorities to ensure a 
smooth transition to publicly owned and run 
waste collection services. The city bought back 
the trucks and some equipment from the private 
company as it had no equipment to run the ser-
vice. It also hired the workers that were previous-
ly employed by the private company and provid-
ed them with better working conditions and pay. 
However, as there was still a skill and human re-
sources gap the trade union supported the mu-
nicipality by reaching out to former waste workers 
who used to deliver the waste collection service 
in Oslo before it was privatised and who still had 
important knowledge of how to operate the mu-
nicipal waste service in-house (see Case 29. 
Waste, Norway, Oslo). 
5.9. LOCKING IN REMUNICIPALISATION 
Remunicipalisation by itself does not guarantee 
that a service will stay in public hands thereafter. 
In Bogotá, Columbia the remunicipalisation of 
waste services only lasted six years. The service 
was re-privatised by a new mayor in February 2018 
despite a strike by 3200 municipal waste collec-
tors affected by the re-privatisation. Rubbish 
piled up on the streets and eventually a ‘state of 
sanitary and environmental emergency’ was de-
clared.41  The new mayor tried to break the strike 
by sending in riot police and several workers were 
injured when clashing with police.42  This shows 
that trade unions need to be prepared for future 
privatisation attempts, especially when regime 
changes occur (see Case 26, Waste, Columbia, 
Bogotá). 
To protect themselves against future privatisa-
tions some countries and cities prohibit the pri-
vatisation of essential public services in their 
national or local constitutions. For example, na-
tional legislation in Uruguay and the Netherlands 
prohibits not only the sale of water systems but 
also the delegation of water services to private 
companies.43  On a city level, the Constitution of 
Mexico City, recognizes essential services, such 
as water and waste, as a human right and outlaws 
their privatisation.44 Moreover, around 40 cities 
worldwide have become “Blue Communities”, 
meaning they are committed to three principles: 
1. recognising water as a human right; 
2. promoting publicly financed, owned and op-
erated water and wastewater services; and 
3. banning the sale of bottled water in public fa-
cilities and at municipal events.45  
Blue Communities thus commit to keep water and 
sewage services in public hands and support 
other cities to do likewise.46 
Strong collective bargaining agreements and 
institutions can also reduce the risk of future 
re-privatisation. In Rostock, Germany the Ver.di 
trade union included a six-year protection clause 
against future privatisation or outsourcing of the 
service without the prior consultation of the un-
ion in its collective agreement with the remu-
nicipalised water service (see Case 38, Water, 
Germany, Rostock). 
Public procurement regulation can also help 
decrease the risk of future privatisation. In 
Winnipeg, Canada the CUPE trade union lobbied 
for a change in the city’s public procurement reg-
ulation, so that contracts are no longer award-
ed on the grounds of the lowest possible price. 
When bids are awarded solely on the basis of cost 
private providers are encouraged to make unre-
alistic offers that put workers, service users and 
the environment at risk; when profit becomes the 
prime motive workers, consumers and/or the en-
vironment are likely to pay the price. Where deci-
sions over whether to privatise a service or not 
are based on social and environmental criteria, 
it is much more likely that the option to deliver 
the service in-house will outperform private bids. 
Including social criteria in public procurement 
frameworks and processes can be a winning 
strategy to prevent future privatisation and lock 
in insourcing (see Case 25, Winnipeg, Canada). 
TAKING OUR PUBLIC SERVICES BACK IN HOUSE40
R
E
M
U
N
I
C
I
P
A
L
I
S
A
T
I
O
N
:
 
A
 
W
O
R
K
E
R
 
A
N
D
 
T
R
A
D
E
 
U
N
I
O
N
 
I
S
S
U
E
 
1. Jakob, C and Sanchez, P. (2015). 
Remunicipalisationandworkers:  Building new 
alliances. In: Kishomoto, S. et al. (eds) Our Public 
Water Future.Transnational Institute (TNI) Available 
at: https://www.tni.org/files/download/ourpub-
licwaterfuture-1.pdf
2. Oliver, B. (2014) The impact of privatisation on un-
ion membership and density: A Western Australian 
case study. The Economic and Labour Relations 
Review. Vol. 25. No. 1, pp. 28-46. 
3. The Smith Institute (2014) Outsourcing the Cuts: 
Pay and Employment Effects of Contracting Out. 
Available at: http://www.smith-institute.org.uk/
wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Outsourcing-the-
cuts.pdf
4. Cibrario, D. (2019) The labour dimension of remu-
nicipalisation: public service workers and trade 
unions in transition. Transnational Instiute (TNI). 
Available at: https://futureispublic.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2019/12/•TNI_working-paper_10_on-
line.pdf  
5. Johnston, D., Saad-Filho, A. (2005) Introduction. 
In: Johnston, D., Saad-Filho, A. (eds). 
Neoliberalism. A critical Reader. London. Pluto 
Press.
6. Van Niekerk, S. and Weghmann, V. (2019) Municipal 
Solid Waste Management Services in Africa and 
Arab Countries. Public Services International. 
Available at: http://www.world-psi.org/en/mu-
nicipal-solid-waste-management-services-afri-
ca-and-arab-countries
7. UNEP (2018) Africa Waste Management Outlook. 
Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Environment 
Prgramme. Available at: https://wedocs.unep.org/
bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/25514/Africa_
WMO.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
8. Achankeng, E. (2003) Globalization, Urbanization 
and Municipal Solid Waste Management in Africa. 
Wiego. Available at: http://www.wiego.org/sites/
default/files/publications/files/Achankeng_
Globalization_Urbanization_MSWMgmt_Africa.pdf
9. Achankeng, E. (2003) Globalization, Urbanization 
and Municipal Solid Waste Management in Africa. 
Wiego.  Available at: http://www.wiego.org/sites/
default/files/publications/files/Achankeng_
Globalization_Urbanization_MSWMgmt_Africa.pdf
10. Business in Cameroon (2018) HYSACAM comments 
on government’s prescription to recruit new waste 
removal companies. Available at: https://www.busi-
nessincameroon.com/environment/0805-8015-hy-
sacam-comments-on-government-s-prescrip-
tion-to-recruit-new-waste-removal-companies 
11. Hermann, C. and Flecjer, J. (2012) Privatization 
of Public Services. Impacts for Employment, 
Working Conditions, and Service Quality in Europe.  
Routledge: New York.
12. https://contrattoacqua.it/chi-siamo/
il-comitato-italiano/ 
13. Bieler, A. (2015) Sic Vos Non Vobis (For You, But 
Not Yours): The struggle for public water in Italy. 
Monthly Review. Vol. 67, no. 5, pp. 35-50. 
14. Carrozza, C. and Fantini, E. 2016. The Italian water 
movement and the politics of the commons. Water 
Alternatives. Vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 99-119.
15. Bieler, A. (13 November 2014) The Struggle for 
Public Water in Italy. Trade unions and global 
restructuring. Available at: http://andreasbieler.
blogspot.com/2014/11/the-struggle-for-public-wa-
ter-in-italy.html
16. Lobina, E. (2018) Commentary on the European 
Commission’s “Study on Water Services in 
Selected Member States. A PSIRU Report com-
missioned by the European Federation of Public 
Service Unions, February 2018 (http://gala.gre.
ac.uk/19211/7/19211%20LOBINA%20European_
Commission%E2%80%99s_Study_on_Water_
Services_2018.pdf). 
17. Lobina, E. (2018) Commentary on the European 
Commission’s “Study on Water Services in 
Selected Member States. A PSIRU Report com-
missioned by the European Federation of Public 
Service Unions, February 2018 (http://gala.gre.
ac.uk/19211/7/19211%20LOBINA%20European_
Commission%E2%80%99s_Study_on_Water_
Services_2018.pdf).
18. Höffler, F. et al. (2013) Rekommunalisierung: 
Renaissance öffentlicher Unternehmen?. 
Wirtschaftsdienst. Vo. 93, pp. 71–86  Available 
at:https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/
s10273-013-1489-1
19. Email exchange with Fagforbundet.
20. Geard, K. (22 September 2016) Trives som kom-
muneansatt. Fagbladet. Available at: https://
fagbladet.no/nyheter/trives-som-kommune-ansatt-
6.91.409748.9e3d1babb3
21. Briefing paper from Fagforbundet for EPSU and PSI 
on the RenoNorden Bankrupcy
22. CUPE (2016) BACK IN HOUSE: Why Local 
Governments are Bringing Services Home. CUPE. 
Available at: https://716.cupe.ca/files/2016/07/
Back-In-House.pdf
23. Gallini, S. (2016) The Zero Garbage Affair in Bogotá. 
p. 72. In: “A Future without Waste? Zero Waste 
in Theory and Practice,” Mauch, C. (ed). RCC 
Perspectives: Transformations in Environment and 
Society. No. 3, pp. 69– 77.
24. Lobina, E et al. (2012) Civil society campaigns and 
social resistance to water privatisation in Latin 
America: A study of policy networks. In Jacobi, P. 
et al. (eds.) Water Governance in Latin America and 
Europe: social actors, conflicts and territoriality. 
São Paulo:  Annablume Editora, pp. 163-173.
A REMUNICIPALISATION GUIDE FOR WORKERS AND TRADE UNIONS 41
R
E
M
U
N
I
C
I
P
A
L
I
S
A
T
I
O
N
:
 
A
 
W
O
R
K
E
R
 
A
N
D
 
T
R
A
D
E
 
U
N
I
O
N
 
I
S
S
U
E
 
25. Cibrario, D. (2019) The labour dimension of remu-
nicipalisation: public service workers and trade 
unions in transition. Transnational Institute (TNI). 
Available at: https://futureispublic.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2019/12/•TNI_working-paper_10_on-
line.pdf
26. Interview with CFDT Interco Union Federation, 
06.09.2018, by Daria Cibrario, PSI.
27. APSE (2019) Rebuilding Capacity. The case for 
insourcing public contracts. Available at: https://
www.apse.org.uk/apse/assets/File/Insourcing%20
(web).pdf
28. COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 
on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ 
rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, 
businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses,  
Art. 3.3
29. Hall, D. (2006) Trade Unions and Reform of Public 
Utilities: International Perspective. Public Services 
International Research Unit (PSIRU). Available 
at: https://gala.gre.ac.uk/id/eprint/3579/1/
PSIRU_3579_-_2006-11-Russia-Intoverview-DH.
pdf
30. The local Government Lawyer (2 February 2017) 
Insourcing: what do you need to know?. The local 
Government Lawyer. Available at: https://www.lo-
calgovernmentlawyer.co.uk/employment/312-em-
ployment-features/33281-insourcing-what-do-you-
need-to-know
31. Curia (13 June 2019) Reference for a preliminary 
ruling — Directive 2001/23/EC — Transfers of 
undertakings — Safeguarding of employees’ rights 
— Concept of ‘worker’ — Substantial change in 
working conditions to the detriment of the em-
ployee. Available at: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
document/document.jsf;jsessionid=C8DDEF-
B6E76C7BE9FDD434CEC90EB505?text=&do-
cid=214945&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=l-
st&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=380435
32. Constitution of the Italian Republic, Art. 97, https://
www.senato.it/documenti/repository/istituzione/
costituzione_inglese.pdf
33. Interview with B. Fasola, CFDT Interco Federation 
by PSI,
34. Cibrario, D. (2019) The labour dimension of remu-
nicipalisation: public service workers and trade 
unions in transition. Transnational Institute (TNI). 
Available at: https://futureispublic.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2019/12/•TNI_working-paper_10_on-
line.pdf
35. Pettersen, B and Monsen, N. (2017) Norwegian 
municipalities bringing social services back into 
public hands. In: Reclaiming Public Services. In: 
Kishimoto, S. and Petitjean, O. (eds) Reclaiming 
Public services. Transnational Institute 
(TNI). Available at: https://www.tni.org/files/
publication-downloads/reclaiming_public_servic-
es.pdf
36. Kramer, G. and Weingarten, J. et al. (2017) 
Branchen Analyse Abfallwirtschaft. Hans Bockler 
Stiftung. No. 354. Pp. 165-72. Available at: https://
www.boeckler.de/pdf/p_study_hbs_354.pdf
37. Kramer, G. and Weingarten, J. et al. (2017) 
Branchen Analyse Abfallwirtschaft. Hans Bockler 
Stiftung. No. 354. Pp. 165-72. Available at: https://
www.boeckler.de/pdf/p_study_hbs_354.pdf
38. Samson, M. and Parra, F. et al (10 March 
2014) Bogota’s mayor trashed for remu-
nicipalizing waste Available at: http://
municipalservicesproject.org/blog/
bogotas-mayor-trashed-remunicipalizing-waste
39. Samson, M. (2016) Old trash, new ideas: public 
waste management and informal reclaimers. In: 
McDonald, D. (ed.)Making Public in a Privatized 
World. The Struggle for Essential Services.
40. Cibrario, D. (2019) The labour dimension of remu-
nicipalisation: public service workers and trade 
unions in transition. Transnational Institute (TNI). 
Available at: https://futureispublic.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2019/12/•TNI_working-paper_10_on-
line.pdf 
41. Noticias Financieras English (3 February 2018) 
Garbage collection in Bogotá.
42. Gill, S. (7  February  2018) Public  service  melt-
down: Bogotá  in  despair  over  3,000  metric  
tons   of   garbage. Columbia  Reports. Available at: 
https://colombiareports.com/public-service-melt-
down-bogota-despair-3000-metric-tons-garbage/
43. Hall, D. and Lobina, E. (2004) Making water 
privatisation illegal: New laws in Netherlands and 
Uruguay. Public services International Research 
Unit (PSIRU)  
Available at: https://gala.gre.ac.uk/id/
eprint/3769/1/PSIRU_9343_-_2004-11-W-crim.pdf
44. Ciudad de Mexico (2017) Consitutcion Politica de la 
Ciudad de Mexico. Available at: http://www.infodf.
org.mx/documentospdf/constitucion_cdmx/
Constitucion_%20Politica_CDMX.pdf
45. The blue planet project (no date) The Blue 
Communities Project. Available at: http://
www.blueplanetproject.net/index.php/home/
water-movements/the-blue-communities-project/
46. Attac Berlin (no date) Blue Community war-
den. Available at: https://attacberlin.de/
ags/argumente-globalisierungskritiker/
blue-community-werden
TAKING OUR PUBLIC SERVICES BACK IN HOUSE42
6. 
: 
: Countering Private  
Company Resistance
C
O
U
N
T
E
R
I
N
G
 
P
R
I
V
A
T
E
 
C
O
M
P
A
N
Y
 
R
E
S
I
S
T
A
N
C
E
6.1. PRIVATE COMPANIES’ TACTICS
For private companies, contracts with the public authorities and governments usual-ly mean substantial profits often over dec-
ades, something they will not give up easily. They 
are likely to strongly resist remunicipalisation and 
some may go as far as using corruption and brib-
ery (see Case 39. Water, Indonesia, Jakarta) or 
bullying and manipulating local politicians (see 
Case 26. Waste, Columbia, Bogotá). Other com-
mon strategies include:
 z The threat of compensation, often enforced by 
international Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
(ISDS) mechanisms
 z National and local legal challenges
 z Manipulation of the media and the public 
narrative 
 z Corporate influence over workers and unions
The next sections will elaborate these strategies.
6.2. COMPENSATION THREATS
Investor protection clauses contained in multilat-
eral and bilateral trade and investment agreements 
represent serious obstacles to remunicipalisation, 
even in cases where private contracts prove to be 
unsatisfactory. Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
(ISDS) mechanisms like ICSID (International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) al-
low multinational companies to sue states before 
an international arbitration tribunal and seek com-
pensation payments in cases of governmental 
decisions that negatively affect their profits.1  Only 
investors can bring forward cases against states 
and not the other way around. In other words, a 
parallel legal system is created through which for-
eign investors can effectively bypass domestic 
courts and administrative procedures to sue host-
state governments in private, international arbitra-
tion tribunals.2
Over the past two decades the number of ISDS 
cases has spiraled. While from the late 1950s, 
when this system was first established, until 
2000, only 50 cases were filed, but the number 
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has subsequently increased dramatically with 500 
cases  recorded between 2000 and 2014.3  As of 
July 2019, the total number of publicly known ISDS 
claims had reached 983.4   Use of ISDS courts is a 
common tool used by private companies in their 
attempt to prevent the insourcing of a public ser-
vice (see for example Case 5. Energy, Lithuania, 
Vilnius; Case 7. Energy, Tanzania, Dar es Salaam; 
Case 33. Water, Bolivia, Cochabamba; Case 42. 
Water, Tanzania, Dar es Salaam; Case 43. Water, 
Turkey, Antalya). In fact, the reason why bilater-
al investment treaties that include ISDS mecha-
nisms were established in the first place was ‘to 
protect investors against expropriation’.5 
ISDS cases are often brought by Western compa-
nies in low- and medium-income countries. This 
has led several scholars to argue that ISDS devel-
oped as a neocolonial mechanism that perpetu-
ated the global asymmetrical relations of power.6 
However, they are increasingly used by investors 
and multinational corporations against some high 
income countries and local governments in west-
ern Europe.7  
Municipalities cannot be a party in an ISDS – only 
nation states can. This makes municipalities more 
vulnerable to compensation threats via ISDS as 
depending on the relevant governance struc-
tures, a municipality could be forced to make pay-
ments to its national government if compensation 
is awarded to an investor. This has led academic 
scholars to warn of a ‘regulatory chill’, meaning 
the prevention of regulatory protections and pol-
icies such as remunicipalisation for fear that an 
investor could take them to arbitration (see Case 
31. Waste, UK, Sheffield). An important part of 
any remunicipalisation campaign is therefore to 
assess whether and to what extent ISDS clauses 
– or any similar provision in international or nation-
al law – might influence the local decision-making 
process.   
However, private companies often inflate the risk 
of compensation in order to deter national and lo-
cal governments from remunicipalising services. 
While ISDS mechanisms indeed provide a power-
ful tool for multinational companies to claim com-
pensation for lost profits when public services are 
nationalized, in practice the scope of compensa-
tion, and even whether compensation is at all re-
quired, is eventually down to negotiation and thus 
the power of individual states and/or regions. 
These negotiations do not take place in a vacu-
um but are influenced by post-colonial contradic-
tions over sovereignty under globalization, and by 
“Women Collecting Water in Tanzania” ©CC Water For People/Kate Harawa
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continued political contestation over the resurgent 
role of the public. As such, not all ISDS claims are 
successful and they can be successfully resist-
ed. For example, when the water service in Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania was remunicipalised the private 
company demanded compensation of $20 mil-
lion - $25 million from the Tanzanian government. 
However, in the end, it was the company which 
had to pay compensation (which it never did due 
to bankruptcy; see Case 42. Water, Tanzania, Dar 
es Salaam). Also, when Cochabamba, Bolivia, 
remunicipalised its water services in 2000, the 
private company, Bechtel, and its Spanish co-in-
vestor Abendoa filed a $50 million compensation 
claim in front of an ICSID Tribunal. The legal dis-
pute lasted four years. This caused international 
protests and press campaigns, demanding that 
the companies drop the claim. In January 2006 
the companies gave in and settled the case for 
a token payment of 2 bolivianos. This marked a 
precedent as it was the first time global public 
pressure caused a large multinational corporation 
to drop a case before the ICSID.8  It also shows 
that multinationals subjected to widespread pub-
lic pressure - including online campaigns and pe-
titions - may drop compensation demands if they 
fear reputational damages (see Case 33. Water, 
Bolivia, Cochabamba).
6.3. LEGAL THREATS 
Legal challenges against remunicipalisation cam-
paigns can be costly. Not only internationally via 
ISDS but also on a national and regional level if 
private companies take local governments to 
court in an attempt to prevent service insourc-
ing (see Case 38. Water, Germany, Rostock). 
However, it  should not be forgotten, that priva-
tisation is complicated and costly. Contracts with 
private providers need to be negotiated, renego-
tiated and monitored on an ongoing basis. They 
often involve legal advisory costs, litigation and 
hearings for both the public authority and private 
companies. In the UK, renegotiations occurred in 
33 per cent of all PPP projects signed between 
2004 and 2006.9  According to evidence to the 
Public Accounts Committee in 2011 consultants 
and lawyers had earned between £2.8 and £4 bil-
lion on all Public Finance Initiative (PFI)*  deals in 
the UK10.  
For example, London remunicipalised some of the 
subway and light rail network in 2007 and 2008. In 
2003, three large PPPs had been set up to mod-
ernise and maintain the infrastructure. Metronet 
BCV, Metronet SSL and Tubelines were awarded a 
30- year contract with Transport for London (TfL) 
worth over £1.7 billion. In 2007 Metronet went into 
administration and in 2010, Tubelines followed, af-
ter Tubelines claimed a £1.35bn funding gap for 
major repair work on two main tube lines. TfL chal-
lenged the cost estimates and won the arbitration 
award. Consequently, Tubelines could not con-
tinue and TfL bought the company for £310 mil-
lion.11  The then Mayor of London, Boris Johnson, 
revealed that lawyers’ fees came to £400 million 
over the course of the contract.  (see Case 20. 
Transport, UK, London).12  
Other hidden costs in the shape of profit guaran-
tees are often included in privatisation contracts, 
making the service far more expensive than it 
would be otherwise. In Berlin, Germany the con-
tract with RWE and Veolia for the provision of 
water included a profit guarantee. The contract 
was kept secret and was not publicly accessible. 
Later it became known that Berlin did not con-
sume as much water as predicted and RWE and 
Veolia then asked Berlin for compensation for 
foregone profits in an arbitration that was again 
negotiated behind closed doors. The private 
companies were thus protected from risks in this 
contract. Or put differently, the risk was borne by 
the public alone.  Where this information is not 
publicly available, campaigning for transparen-
cy in contracts with the private companies can 
provide a stepping stone for a remunicipalisation 
campaign, as the campaign coalition, the Berliner 
Wassertisch, in Berlin demonstrated (see Case 
37. Water, Germany, Berlin).13  
6.4. CORPORATE INFLUENCE ON 
WORKERS AND UNIONS
Corporate capture can take more direct forms. 
For example, there is a danger that some work-
ers affected by privatisation can be “bought 
off” through early retirement schemes or other 
* A PFI is a way to finance a PPP through private capital in the 
UK. In a 2018 PSIRU report Helen Mercer and Dexter Whitfield 
demonstrate that the usage of PFIs are based on flawed 
assumptions which allow myriad forms of wealth extraction 
from the public assets while imposing costs on public author-
ities and the wider economy.
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inducements.14  According to a 2001 study,15  this 
was the case with the 1993 water privatisation in 
Buenos Aires, Argentina. Having been offered a 
ten per cent shareholding in the private conces-
sionaire Aguas Argentinas, the main trade unions 
halted their resistance and became supporters 
of the privatisation - convinced of its inevitability. 
However, it should also be said that after a num-
ber of years, the union became opposed to the 
privatisation and their shareholding later enabled 
trade unions to engage in the 2006 remunicipal-
isation process. Later, when a new national gov-
ernment proposed re-privatisation of water ser-
vices, the same trade unions fiercely defended 
the new public enterprise AySA (see Case 32. 
Water Argentina, Buenos Aires).16 
The risk of corporate capture makes it crucial that 
national unions and branch representatives com-
municate clearly and regularly with workers over 
the remunicipalisation process. The development 
of a cohesive national union strategy on remunici-
palisation is also beneficial to foster solidarity and 
unity among different sections of the same un-
ion and across different struggles. Moreover, un-
ion-led educational events and awareness-rising 
initiatives to share knowledge among public ser-
vice workers about insourcing can help prevent 
future conflict and address perceived divergent 
interests among workers about tobe remunicipal-
ised. For example, in Norway the Fagforbundet 
union trained its activists in dedicated workshops 
to prepare the Oslo waste service remunicipalisa-
tion (see Case 29. Waste, Norway, Oslo).
6.5. THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA
The press and media are rarely impartial about 
remunicipalisation. Mainstream media might be 
owned or influenced by private companies or 
media magnates with an interest in promoting the 
privatisation/commercialisation of public servic-
es and influence neoliberal thinking. Likewise, 
pro-ruling party or pro-government media can 
take a partial stance in the debate over remunici-
palisation and on the social movements that often 
accompany the process. It is therefore important 
for pro-remuncipalisation groups to identify how 
they can engage with the media and build their 
own independent communication and social me-
dia strategy. With the remunicipalisation of waste 
collection in Oslo, Norway it was the trade un-
ion’s magazine, Fagbladet, that first revealed the 
poor working conditions at the private company 
Veireno which then went bankrupt - consequently 
the waste service was in-sourced. The reporting 
in the magazine helped to get the story covered 
in national media which facilitated public support 
for waste service remunicipalisation (see Case 
29. Waste, Norway, Oslo). 
In Italy, the water forum faced explicit silencing 
by the mainstream media regarding information 
about the referendum. Nonetheless, 27.6 million 
Italian citizens voted against legislation that guar-
anteed a profit of seven per cent to private inves-
tors running water supply networks.17  There was 
a turnout of 54 per cent with a 95 per cent vote in 
favour. Until then 24 previous referenda had failed 
over more than a decade, as the required quorum 
of 51 per cent had not been attained.18 Despite 
the silence of the media, a high turn-out at the 
referendum was achieved through face to face 
mobilisation.19  
When Hamburg’s inhabitants prepared for a ref-
erendum in September 2013 to remunicipalise 
the electricity grid, Vattenfall, one of the multina-
tional companies that owned the grid, launched 
an advertising campaign in three main newspa-
pers20   - die Bild, Hamburger Abendblatt and die 
Welt - and on local transport.21  In response to 
the arguments against remunicipalisation, the cit-
izen coalition “Unser Hamburg, Unser Netz” (our 
Hamburg, our Grid) countered the fearmongering 
of the media with creative and factual campaign 
materials. For example, an animated YouTube vid-
eo explained why the remunicipalisation of the 
electricity, gas and long-distance heating grid 
would aid the transition towards renewable en-
ergy and empower the municipality to guarantee 
basic services. The video defined electricity and 
heating as a common good that should be dem-
ocratically controlled. As it was frequently argued 
in the mainstream press that the remunicipalisa-
tion would burden the municipal budget with €2 
billion, the video also demonstrated a detailed 
cost-benefit analysis, which showed that the re-
municipalisation would not impact on the budget 
at all as the electricity grid could be purchased 
through a loan from the municipal credit society 
(HGV) that would be repaid over time through the 
income generated from electricity bills (see Case 
2. Energy, Germany, Hamburg).22 
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7. 
: 
: 
Innovative Forms of Public 
Service Delivery and Financing
7.1. PUBLIC SERVICES THAT WORK FOR 
THE PEOPLE 
One of the critical factors for the success of remunicipalisation is the way public ser-vices can be sustainably financed without 
disproportionate costs for users, dwellers and 
workers, especially the most vulnerable. In effect, 
lack of resources, conservative budgeting and 
austerity are among the most common arguments 
used in favour of privatisation, since it is claimed 
that only private companies are able to make the 
necessary upfront investment needed to setup, 
run and maintain a particular service. 
Previous PSIRU research1  has shown that this is 
not the case as private sector financing is usually 
much more expensive because it 
a) relies on borrowing private money which is 
more expensive than public sector bonds; 
b) the private sector needs to make profits and 
the dividends paid out to the shareholders 
add to the cost; and  
c) the private sector may be more prone to 
corruption, which is incentivised by the lu-
crative long-term contracts that function as 
a profit-guarantee for the private companies. 
The cost of corruption will essentially be car-
ried by the public purse. 
The public sector therefore has a comparative ad-
vantage in financing the delivery of public servic-
es, while alternative funding mechanisms exist to 
deliver public services when public budgets are 
constrained. These include:
 z Procurement guidelines for public anchor 
institutions to keep local resources in the 
community
 z The use of Public-Public-Partnerships
 z Participatory Budgeting
 z The involvement of cooperatives to deliver 
public services based on the principle of 
universal access
7.2. “ANCHOR INSTITUTIONS” – 
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS WITH LEVERAGE
Preston, a city in the county of Lancashire, UK 
is showing how rethinking public services can 
transform an entire city. Preston is battling with 
austerity as Lancashire’s central government grant 
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was cut by 40 per cent between 2011-2017. The 
city unemployment and social inequality rates are 
high.2  
Inspired by cooperatively run communities in 
Cleveland, Ohio, and by the world’s largest co-op-
erative group, Mondragón, in the Basque region 
of Spain, the Mayor of Preston decided to turn its 
local economy around by transforming public pro-
curement practices and thus the public services 
themselves. Preston started with its six biggest 
public institutions (called ‘anchor institutions’), 
Preston City Council, Lancashire County Council, 
Preston’s College, University of Central Lancashire, 
Lancashire Constabulary, and Community 
Gateway, and helped them to re-organise their 
supply chains and identify where they could buy 
goods and services locally.3  Consequently, local 
public spending increased significantly, despite 
budget cuts as procurement was brought back to 
the short, local supply chains. In 2012/13, £750m 
was spent on goods and services by the six an-
chor institutions, but only a tiny proportion of it 
was spent locally: only five per cent was spent 
in Preston and 39 per cent across Lancashire. By 
2016/17 local spending had increased significant-
ly; of £620m spent on goods and services by the 
same anchor institutions 19 per cent was spent in 
Preston and 81 per cent in Lancashire as a whole.4 
Legally, Preston’s initiative is based on the Public 
Services (Social Value) Act 2013, which allows 
public bodies in England to take the social, envi-
ronmental and economic impact of their commis-
sioning into account.5  
  
Preston also promotes the establishment of 
worker-owned cooperatives that can compete 
for public sector contracts.6  The council has im-
plemented and promoted the real Living Wage,7 
which is independently calculated to meet the 
real cost of living.8   This, in turn, has had a positive 
knock-on effect on local public spending as many 
public sector workers live in the localities, they 
work in. The whole community has benefited. In 
2016 Preston was named best city in north-west 
England in which to live and work9  and in 2018 
the accountancy firm PricewaterhouseCoopers 
rated Preston as the most improved city in its 
Good Growth Index.10   
The Preston case shows that local authorities 
through progressive public procurement prac-
tices can foster social inclusion in their local 
communities even at times of austerity and budget 
cuts. When the direct remunicipalisation of public 
services is not possible, a local social responsi-
bility approach that encourages the creation of 
workers’ cooperatives can be a better alternative 
to the provision of public services by multina-
tional companies. It is essential though that the 
cooperatives providing the service ensure every-
one has access to these vital services and not 
just cooperative members. However, the Preston 
model does not challenge the market logic as it 
continues to outsource and maintains the (local) 
for-profit delivery of public services. The Preston 
model is, therefore, not a replacement for remu-
nicipalisation and public ownership. 
7.3. PUBLIC-PUBLIC PARTNERSHIPS
 
Public-Public-Partnerships (PuPs) are distinct 
from Public-Private-Partnerships (PPPs). PuPs 
are a collaboration between two or more public 
partners to improve the capacity and effective-
ness of one or all partners in providing public ser-
vices. PuPs can be between countries, between 
different municipalities or cover different public 
services in one municipality. Based on solidar-
ity and a commitment not to make private prof-
its, PuPs are peer relationships forged around 
common values and objectives.11 The absence of 
commercial considerations allows the PuPs part-
ners to reinvest all available resources into the 
development of local capacity. This enables the 
partners to build mutual trust and thus translates 
into long term capacity gains. 
In practice, PuPs’ work can be divided into five 
broad categories:
 z training and developing human resources, 
 z technical support on a wide range of issues, 
 z improving efficiency and building institutional 
capacity,
 z financing services, 
 z improving public participation.
A common way to initiate PuPs is through city to 
city relationships. For example, Sevilla, Spain, 
developed several PUPs that were motivated by 
international solidarity. A PuP between Sevilla and 
Ciudad Sandino, Nicaragua led to the establish-
ment of a municipal water company with public 
participation. There are also country to country 
PuPs; or example, a partnership between Finland 
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and Vietnam was developed though the Finnish 
bilateral development agency (FINNIDA) and led 
to a more efficient water supply system and work-
force training in Vietnam. Between 1990 and 1995 
50 per cent of the investment of the Vietnamese 
water company, Hai Phong Water Supply Company 
(HPWSC), came from this PuP.12   
PuPs can also be a means to protect a public 
company that is threatened by privatisation. In 
Cali, Columbia in 2016 Emcali, a municipal public 
service provider of water, electricity and telecom-
munications, was required by the municipal gov-
ernment to privatise its telecommunication unit, 
as it was supposedly not making enough profit. 
The water utility union, Sintraemcali, resisted the 
privatisation and was successful in proposing the 
establishment of a PUP instead. Antel, Uruguay’s 
state-owned telecommunication company, which 
provides the world’s most inclusive and America’s 
fastest national broadband network, set up a PuP 
with Emcali.13  
In Paris, France, Eau de Paris encourages pub-
lic peer-to-peer learning and supports capac-
ity building for public utilities in and outside of 
France.  
PUPs can also be set up at a municipal or regional 
level. As found by a recent German study14   region-
al-level PuPs are especially common in the waste 
sector as it is easier and more advantageous for 
municipalities with small budgets to share equip-
ment and mutualize assets and costs. These 
PuPs are at times called “intermunicipal consor-
tiums”.  The Sardinia region in Italy set up an in-
ter-municipal public waste management system. 
Not only did it establish an effective waste sorting 
system, it also reduced its waste generation by 16 
per cent - 143,724 tones - between 2006-2015.15 
Another form of PuP is the cross-subsidisation 
of public services, which can help to ensure the 
financial sustainability of basic public services 
even when they are not individually profitable. 
In Germany this is a common way to fund public 
services that cannot be financed by user-charg-
es alone and would only be accessible to the 
wealthier users if they were not subsidised. With 
austerity measures, Munich, like other cities in 
Germany, experienced a decrease in national 
funding for public transport, leading to a deficit 
for the Munich Transport Company (MVG). Its par-
ent company, Munich’s public utility Stadtwerke 
I
N
N
O
V
A
T
I
V
E
 
F
O
R
M
S
 
O
F
 
P
U
B
L
I
C
 
S
E
R
V
I
C
E
 
D
E
L
I
V
E
R
Y
 
A
N
D
 
F
I
N
A
N
C
I
N
G
Royal Bathroom at the Alcázar in Seville, Spain 
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Muenchen (SWM), balanced this debt with the 
surplus achieved in the electricity sector.16  
7.4. PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING
The practice of participatory budgeting was first 
introduced in Puerto Alegre (Brazil) over 30 years 
ago. The aim is to enable local people to have 
democratic control over municipal budgets en-
suring public spending is in line with the interests 
of the community. Since then it has been adopted 
by many municipalities across the world. It is es-
timated that there are currently over 20,000 par-
ticipatory budgeting projects globally, involving at 
least at least 1,700 local governments in over 40 
countries.17
  
Research has shown that participatory budget-
ing (PB) has led to improvements in the provision 
of basic public services. A study that reviewed 
the experience in 20 locations across the world 
showed that the most prioritised public services 
with PB are infrastructures, specifically roads and 
paths, followed by water and wastewater man-
agement and treatment, as well as energy and 
public lighting. In Scotland £500,000 has been 
allocated via PB to bus transport in the Western 
Isles.18   In Yaoundé, Cameroon, a project ap-
proved through PB led to a water tap serving a 
community of 50,000 inhabitants and in Porto 
Alegre, Brazil it approved the creation of a water 
treatment plant.
PB typically involves a small share of the local 
authority budget. Among the local communities 
with the largest PB resources are Ilo, Peru; Porto 
Alegre and Guarulhos in Brazil. Here residents 
through PB have a say on a budget equivalent to 
more than US$ 120 per inhabitant per year. Most 
PB projects fall into the US$ 2–35 per inhabitant 
per year range.19 
Although PB is often applied to a small part of lo-
cal government budgets, it has led to considera-
ble improvements in basic public service access 
and residents’ quality of life enabling the com-
munity to collectively allocate resources to meet 
specific local situations and needs. PB can also 
increase transparency and accountability; and 
can enhance democratic governance within com-
munities, local government, and in the interaction 
between the two. Interestingly, there are indica-
tions that PB can even boost municipal budgets 
as it correlates with higher tax revenues and lower 
tax evasion. Presumably, this is because the PB 
process raises awareness among the popula-
tion about the level of municipal resources, their 
source and constraints.20  
7.5.  COOPERATIVES’ PARTICIPATION
Public ownership and control of public services 
can be combined with cooperative and com-
munity ownership. This is especially evident in 
the energy sector in Europe where there has 
been a trend towards local participation in ener-
gy systems on a municipal and community level. 
However, while decentralisation can create initial 
space for community and/or workers run coop-
eratives, there is also a danger that cooperatives 
turn into gated, members only energy communi-
ties leaving part of the population excluded. It is 
therefore crucial that no matter what form public 
ownership takes, the principle of universal access 
must be enshrined. 
A successful way of combining public and coop-
erative ownerships was piloted in Wolfhagen, a 
small town in the middle of Germany, among the 
first to remunicipalise its electricity grid after 20 
years of privatisation. In 2010 – four years after 
the remunicipalisation of the grid - the munici-
pality aimed to widen citizen participation and 
to increase the resources invested in renewable 
energy by establishing a local cooperative that 
would partly own the municipal utility. In 2012 
the cooperative, Buergerenergiegenossenschaft 
Wolfhagen (BEG), was founded with 264 mem-
bers and capital of over €800,000. The BEG at-
tained ownership of 25 per cent of the munici-
pal utility.21  Only electricity users can become a 
member of the BEG cooperative by buying a share 
of €500 capped to 40 shares per member. This 
model enabled the municipal utility to have more 
resources available for renewable energy projects 
while it also functioned as a stable investment 
for the members. Moreover, it strengthened the 
democratic governance of the municipal utility as 
cooperative members could directly participate 
in the decision-making. The BEG is represented 
in the governing body of the municipal authority, 
which consists of nine people, of which two are 
representatives of the BEG, one of the work coun-
cil and six of the municipality.22  In March 2018 
the BEG had 850 members and managed about 
four million euros for its members (see Case 4 
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Energy, Germany Wolfhagen).23   A similar model 
has been explored in Stuttgart, Germany where 
a successful remunicipalisation of the electricity 
grid was followed by a partnership between the 
municipality and a community cooperative to in-
crease the supply of green energy (see Case 3 
Energy Stuttgart). 
These examples show that public ownership and 
cooperatives are not mutually exclusive but can 
operate in partnership with each other. This can 
be especially relevant when it comes to natural 
monopolies such as the energy grid – there is only 
one set of pylons and cables that bring electricity 
to the end users. A decarbonised energy system 
depends on a modern and expansive grid into 
which renewable energy can be fed. Hence, the 
production of local and community-run renewable 
energy rests on a grid that is fit for purpose. In 
Denmark which is one of Europe’s leaders in terms 
of renewable energy, strong community engage-
ment in wind energy was only possible because 
the grid is publicly owned and controlled. Most of 
the wind energy production in Denmark is based 
on local ownership. By 2013, 70-80 per cent of 
existing wind turbines were owned by communi-
ties.24  This is facilitated by an arrangement where 
the turbine owners are only required to pay for 
the connection to the closest technically-feasible 
point in the grid and the remainder of the network 
expansion is covered by the utilities. This combi-
nation of public and community ownership proved 
to be highly successful: almost half of Denmark’s 
energy is produced by wind energy.25  
While the participation of communities and coop-
eratives in electricity production should be en-
couraged it is important to ensure that their par-
ticipation does not involve for-profit energy sale 
at the expense of other community residents who 
are not members of the cooperative. Otherwise, 
there is a real danger of increased corporate in-
volvement in the public utility and privatisation. 
The individualisation of the energy production has 
already become a profit opportunity for multi-na-
tional data companies like Amazon and Google, 
which are moving into the energy sector through 
home-energy automation.26  
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8. 
: 
: 
Conclusions:   
Summary of Lessons learnt
LESSON 1: DO NOT PRIVATISE IN THE 
FIRST PLACE
The best way to avoid the negative impact of privatisation on workers, users and com-munities – as well as the costs of remunic-
ipalisation - is not to privatise in the first place. 
Trade unions can send out this message clearly 
to politicians and policy makers pushing for public 
service privatisation. They can back their position 
with the ample available evidence on the many 
problems of privatisation and the advantages of 
public service provision.
LESSON 2: DEVELOP A CONCRETE CASE 
FOR REMUNICIPALISATION
It is important to evidence that privatisation, in its 
many forms has harmed communities, the envi-
ronment and workers and to change the pro-pri-
vatisation narrative. But trade unions need to go 
beyond highlighting the failures of privatisation 
and make concrete, evidence-based propos-
als for the insourcing of public services. Around 
the world trade unions and their allies have 
demonstrated through detailed cost-benefit anal-
yses that public services can be enhanced when 
they are publicly owned and controlled. 
LESSON 3: REMUNICIPALISATION CAN 
HELP TO REVERSE THE GLOBAL TIDE OF 
PRIVATISATION 
Remunicipalisation can help to reverse the global 
tide of privatisation. More and more local com-
munities around the word and across sectors are 
insourcing public services and managing them 
directly and developing new forms of democrat-
ic and participatory governance to enhance the 
quality of the service - accordingly a global rep-
ertoire is being built that showcases better public 
alternatives.
LESSON 4: PUBLIC OWNERSHIP IS 
INTEGRAL TO CHALLENGING CLIMATE 
CHANGE
It is unlikely that private companies that privilege 
profit and shareholder value will take steps to 
build the infrastructure and make the investment 
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necessary to tackle climate change. The switch to 
renewable energy will not be made through the 
market. Environmental activists are natural allies in 
campaigns for remunicipalisation. 
LESSON 5: REMUNICIPALISATION 
BENEFITS WORKERS AND TRADE UNIONS 
When strategically planned and implemented re-
municipalisation can offer an opportunity to im-
prove public service workers conditions includ-
ing pay, staffing levels, skill development, health 
and safety and representation at work. Insourcing 
can also provide opportunities to increase trade 
union membership and collective bargaining cov-
erage. The majority of cases studies highlighted 
in this report show that workers and their trade 
unions have ultimately benefitted by supporting 
remunicipalisation. 
LESSON 6: WORKERS, UNIONS AND CIVIL 
SOCIETY ORGANISATION UNITE  
Public service workers, unions, users and local 
communities all lose out through privatisation. 
Conversely, trade unions increase their chances 
of success when they campaign as leaders or as 
members of wider remunicipalisation coalitions 
together with civil society organisations and com-
munity groups based on solidarity and shared, 
progressive objectives. 
LESSON 7: THINK LOCAL. EMBEDDING 
THE REMUNICIPALISATION CAMPAIGNS IN 
COMMUNITY ISSUES. 
Trade unions promoting public service remunic-
ipalisation can significantly enhance their advo-
cacy and win more support by connecting their 
demands with the key issues and unaddressed 
needs of local communities. Linking up and mak-
ing the case for public service remunicipalisation 
as a viable solution to concrete local problems 
has consistently proved a winning strategy.
LESSON 8: PLAN REMUNICIPALISATION 
STRATEGICALLY AND PREPARE
Good public services cannot be set up and made 
run overnight. It is important to plan ahead and 
prepare for remunicipalisation so that the human 
and financial resources, governance, the institu-
tional set up, the infrastructures, the equipment, 
and the necessary workers are all in place and in 
good shape to run the service smoothly as soon 
as possible after the remunicipalisation process 
is completed.  
LESSON 9: LOCK REMUNICIPALISATION 
IN 
Remunicipalisation and a well-run public service 
are not the end of the journey as there is always 
the danger of re-privatisation. If the service is 
profitable the private operators will most certainly 
seek to get their foot back in the door. Careful at-
tention is required when remunicipalised services 
grant advisory contracts to private companies, as 
this can be used by the companies to get a foot 
in the door for future privatisations. Unions can 
prevent this from happening by anticipating and 
monitoring signs of re-privatisation and by lock-
ing in remuncipalisation via collective bargaining 
agreements, local government constitutions and 
public procurement regulations. 
LESSON 10: THINK GLOBAL. BUILD 
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR 
REMUNICIPALISATION
 
Local remunicipalisation campaigns are more suc-
cessful when they are publicly visible,and have 
international resonance through, for instance, ef-
fective international media strategies, online peti-
tions and videos.
LESSON 11: DOCUMENT AND SHARE YOUR 
REMUNICIPALISATION STORY
 
It is crucial that trade unions – as well as their civ-
il society allies and local governments - involved 
in a public service remunicipalisation campaign 
and/or process share their insider knowledge, 
expertise and lessons learnt. It is with this on the 
ground knowledge that national and international 
trade union federations can pool the expertise to 
strengthen the global public service movement. 
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9. 
: 
: 
A Remunicipalisation Check-list 
for Workers and Trade Unions
Based on the review of the remunicipalisa-tion cases contained in this guide here are some key factors trade unions could con-
sider when planning a public service insourcing 
campaign:
MAP THE PRIVATISED SERVICE 
PERFORMANCE 
 z What is the performance of the private company 
in delivering services?
 z How much and with what results did the private 
company invest in the service?
 z Is the private operator addressing climate 
change issues in the way it runs the service?
 z Is the private operator enhancing user access 
to the service?
 z How is private sector delivery affecting inequality 
and social inclusion in the local community and 
particularly fuel and water poverty?
 z How has privatisation affected jobs and working 
conditions?
 z What costs were incurred for local authorities 
during the privatisation of the service (for 
example, how high were the fees paid to lawyers 
involved in negotiating and re-negotiating the 
contract and did the local authority have to 
subsidise the private provider?)
 
 z What profits and shareholder payments does 
the privatised service generate per year?
 z How much of the profit was reinvested into the 
maintenance and enhancement of the service?
 z Did the private company accumulate an 
unreasonable amount of debt when running the 
service?
 z Is the company supporting vulnerable users 
and households to access the service?
 z What is the governance system within the 
service? Do users, citizens and workers have a 
say in how the service is operated? 
CONTRACT TERMINATION VERSUS 
NON-RENEWAL
 
 z When does the current private contract expire? 
Will it be retendered or renewed?
 
 z What is the process to follow for contract 
renewal or termination (international, national, 
local law and contract including the fine print)?
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 z Do tendering criteria go beyond cost to enshrine 
social and environmental targets?
 z Mapping trade union presence and membership
 
 z Which trade union(s) represent workers in the 
private contracted operator?
 
 z Where and who are unorganised workers?
 z What are the levels of trade union membership?
 z What are national and branch trade un-
ion policies with regard to public service 
remunicipalisation?
 z If more unions are present at the same 
workplace, can they work together? What 
are their common objectives with regard to 
remunicipalisation?
 z What legislations (international, national and 
local) are there to regulate the orderly return of 
private to public services? 
 z What support can national and international 
trade union federations and confederations 
provide?
BUILDING POLITICAL AND COMMUNITY 
SUPPORT FOR REMUNICIPALISATION
 z What is the position of the local and regional 
authorities on remunicipalisation?
 z What is the position of the national authorities 
(if any) on remunicipalisation?
 z Which civil society and environmental groups 
and community leaders could join a pro-
remunicipalisation campaign coalition?
 z Which politicians and/or elected representa-
tives are or could be in favour of the service 
remunicipalisation? Which ones could trade un-
ions work with?
 z How can the public opinion be mobilised to 
support service remunicipalisation?
 z What are the community issues related 
to the service that would benefit from 
remunicipalisation?
 z What are the shared and individual objectives 
of each group in the remunicipalisation? 
 z What mobilisation tactics could be the most 
effective (e.g. demonstrations, public hearings, 
flash mobs etc.)?
 z What media strategy would be most useful 
(international, national, local newspapers; 
publication of report; pamphlets; videos; social 
media, international online petitions etc.)?
RUNNING THE CAMPAIGN
 
 z What are the costs of running the campaign 
and available resources?
 z What are the legal and regulatory obstacles and 
what advice is available?
 z Running the public service 
 z What are the initial, mid-term and long-term 
cost implications for the local authorities if they 
were to takeback control of the service?
 z Are there enough resources to remunicipalise 
and smoothly run the service afterwards (local 
or national authorities’ budgets, taxation, 
inter-governmental transfers, other resource 
streams, user fees, savings and profits from 
service, etc.)?
 z Where can additional or alternative resources 
be found?
 z Do local authorities still have in house capacity, 
staff, equipment and skills to operate the service 
efficiently? If not, how can this be restored and 
how can unions help?
 z Will private companies likely withhold strategic 
information, staff and equipment? If so, what 
can unions do to about it?
A REMUNICIPALISATION GUIDE FOR WORKERS AND TRADE UNIONS 57
A
 
R
E
M
U
N
I
C
I
P
A
L
I
S
A
T
I
O
N
 
C
H
E
C
K
-
L
I
S
T
 
F
O
R
 
W
O
R
K
E
R
S
 
A
N
D
 
T
R
A
D
E
 
U
N
I
O
N
S
BUILDING A SHARED VISION FOR THE 
REMUNICIPALISED PUBLIC SERVICE
 
 z What form(s) of democratic governance, 
workers and user participation, transparency 
and accountability will be embedded in the 
remunicipalised service? 
 z How will the public service effectively and bet-
ter address social issues (e.g. boosting the 
local economy, creating quality employment, 
responsible public procurement, gender re-
sponsiveness, occupational health and safety 
measures)?
 
 z How will the public service effectively and 
better address environmental issues?
 z How will the public service effectively ensure 
worker participation and pilot progressive, 
innovative human resources practices?
DEALING WITH PRIVATE COMPANIES’ 
REACTION
 z What are likely responses that can be expected 
from the private companies?
 z Will they seek compensation and how much 
(estimate)? What are the options to avoid or 
reduce such costs?
 z Will the cost of compensation be lower than 
the overall cost of keeping the service private?
PREPARING A FAIR WORKERS’ 
TRANSITION
 z What legislation (international, national, local) 
is there to protect workers and trade union 
representation in the transition?
 z Are workers covered by one (or multiple) 
collective agreements?
 z Are there union representatives at the 
workplace(s) of the service that will be 
remunicipalised?
 z Are the representative union federations and 
local representatives in agreement over the 
remunicipalisation? If not, can their diverging 
views be reconciled?
 z Will the union(s) likely lose or win more 
members in the mid and long-term from the 
remunicipalisation? How can membership loss 
be avoided, minimized? 
 z What are main concerns of affected workers 
(pay, job title, seniority entitlements, pension, 
re-hiring process etc.) and how can they be 
duly addressed (e.g. information session with 
workers)?
 z Is there social dialogue and collective 
bargaining with the local authorities that would 
be responsible for the remunicipalised service? 
Are collective bargaining structures in place? If 
not, how can negotiations be opened over a 
fair transition for workers?
 z How will the union(s) plan to identify union 
negotiators and give them a common mandate 
to negotiate the transition with the future public 
service employer(s)?
LOCKING REMUNICIPALISATION IN
 z How can remunicipalisation be locked in?
 z How can the trade union(s) and the civil society 
groups establish a monitoring process that 
guards future re-privatisation attempts?
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